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Trade Policy and Export Performance in Morocco 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Morocco‟s trade policy is at a cross-roads.  Historically, the country has had a very restrictive 
import regime that generated substantial transfers to domestic producers.  In terms of the simple 
average of most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs, Morocco is one of the ten most highly protected 
markets in the world.  Yet, with the signing of the Euro-Med Agreement with the European Union 
and its implementation since 2000, a decision for the gradual opening of the domestic market through 
preferential trade liberalization was taken.  This choice was subsequently reaffirmed through the 
conclusion of further free trade agreements with the United States and Turkey.  The resulting shift in 
trade policy paradigms promises to create new opportunities for export-led economic growth and 
employment generation, while requiring adjustment of domestic producers to the new, more 
competitive economic environment and additional policy reforms to complement the market opening 
strategy. 
2. Over the past decade, Morocco‟s export performance has been lackluster.  The country has 
lost world market share in merchandise exports, and the current account surpluses in recent years 
have only been achieved on the back of strong services exports and migrant remittances.  
Diversification out of traditional exports, such as apparel, has been slow, and the end of the export 
quotas under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement since the beginning of 2005 is exposing Moroccan textile 
and clothing exporters to direct competition with low-cost producers in Eastern Europe and East Asia.  
In this context, the bilateral free trade agreements and the market access preferences these offer are 
expected to help Moroccan exporters to defend their position in established markets (EU), enhance 
their presence in currently underexploited markets (USA), and procure intermediate inputs at lower 
costs than was previously possible (Turkey). 
3. However, the choice to open the domestic market through preferential agreements involves 
several challenges that warrant the attention of policy makers.  First, the opening of the domestic 
market is selective in the sense that only partner countries can sell their products in the Moroccan 
markets at low import tariffs, while third country exporters continue to face high MFN-rates.  This 
asymmetry can lead to the diversion of trade flows from more efficient third country producers to less 
efficient partner country producers, resulting in a loss of tariff revenues for Morocco without its 
economy benefiting from lower purchasing costs.  In order to contain these economic costs of trade 
diversion, the government should reduce its MFN-tariffs vis-à-vis third countries. 
4. Second, the opening of the Moroccan market through preferential agreements is partial by 
leaving the highly protected agricultural and services sectors largely untouched.  Indeed, effective 
rates of protection for agri-food products are bound to increase over time, as tariffs on industrial 
goods are phased out.  High protection is making it possible for very inefficient firms in the sector to 
survive to the extent that some agro-processing firms show negative value-added at international 
prices.  The government should actively encourage an efficiency-enhancing restructuring in the agri-
food sector by gradually lowering trade barriers and increasingly exposing domestic producers to 
international market discipline. 
5. Third, Morocco‟s choice of international integration through preferential agreements is so far 
largely static by focusing on tariff reductions among partner countries.  Yet, international experience 
suggests that substantial additional benefits over time can be derived from “deep integration” that 
involves the harmonization of standards, as well as the liberalization of services.  Also, the adoption 
of simple to administer rules of origin across different preferential agreements can markedly facilitate 
trade. 
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6. In parallel to lowering policy-generated trade barriers, Morocco should make additional 
efforts to reduce overall trade transactions costs to the benefit of both importers and exporters.  The 
country has a generic advantage in its geographic proximity to the large Western European market.  
Yet, trade logistics costs are high and European apparel buyers, for example, complain about the lack 
of reliability of shipments from Morocco.  In order to overcome these impediments, the government 
should foster competition in port operations and transport services and create a business environment 
that is supportive for the establishment of modern logistics operations. 
1.  BACKGROUND 
7. Over the past decade, Morocco has gradually advanced the opening of its economy to the 
international market.  Tariffs were reduced, non-tariff barriers phased-out, and foreign trade 
procedures simplified.  The country also broadened and diversified its economic and trading 
relationships by concluding preferential trade agreements with bilateral and regional trading partners 
and contributing to the consolidation of the multilateral trading system.  As a result, total trade as the 
sum of merchandise exports and imports increased from less than 40 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1995 to more than 60 per cent in 2004. 
8. Openness is in general positively associated with economic and employment growth.  During 
the 1990s, the developing countries that pursued an active world market integration strategy achieved 
economic growth of about 5 per cent per capita, i.e. more than twice the level observed in high-
income countries.  In contrast, developing countries that did not open their economies experienced 
lower, and on average negative, growth rates (Figure 1). Moreover, Schott (2003) notes that despite 
all the lively debate about whether trade openness contributes to growth, all the empirical estimates 
confirm a positive relationship.  
 
Figure 1:  Market Openness and Economic Growth during the 1990s 
(Per cent increase in GDP per capita) 
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Source:  Dollar and Kray, 2001. 
9. For Morocco, econometric analysis indicates that increased trade has had a positive impact on 
GDP (Bouoiyour, J., 2003).  Import expansion was found to increase goods exports, which in turn 
triggered higher GDP growth.  However, exports have not been strong enough to pull the economy 
towards the economic growth rates that many other emerging economies have enjoyed.  Indeed, since 
2002 merchandise exports have been increasingly falling short of imports, implying increasing trade 
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balance deficits.  The current account surpluses during recent years have only been achieved on the 
back of strong remittances-transfers from emigrants (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1:  Current Account Balance, 1995-2004 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 in million USD 
Goods -2 482 -2 193 -1 864 -2 319 -2 448 -3 235 -3 022 -3 061 -4 345 -6 488 
Services  284  961  747  864 1 112 1 142 1 911 1 947 2 617 3 387 
Trade balance -2 198 -1 232 -1 117 -1 455 -1 336 -2 093 -1 111 -1 114 -1 728 -3 101 
Investment income -1 318 -1 309 -1 175 -1 033 - 986 - 864 - 833 - 738 - 792 - 651 
Current transfers 2 330 2 576 2 205 2 345 2 154 2 483 3 555 3 330 4 102 4 860 
Current account -1 186  35 - 87 -144 -167 -475 1 611 1 477 1 582 1 109 
 in per cent of GDP 
Goods -7.5 -6.0 -5.6 -6.5 -6.9 -9.7 -8.9 -8.5 -9.9 -13.0 
Services 0.9 2.6 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.4 5.6 5.4 6.0 6.8 
Trade balance -6.6 -3.4 -3.4 -4.1 -3.7 -6.3 -3.3 -3.1 -3.9 -6.2 
Investment income -4.0 -3.6 -3.5 -2.9 -2.8 -2.6 -2.5 -2.0 -1.8 -1.3 
Current transfers 7.1 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.1 7.4 10.5 9.2 9.4 9.8 
Current account -3.6 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -1.4 4.8 4.1 3.6 2.2 
Source:  Moroccan Foreign Currency Board. 
 
10. This chapter provides a detailed account of Morocco‟s trade performance in the context of the 
country‟s economic growth and poverty reduction agenda.  The analysis thereby falls into four parts:  
First, recent export and trade developments are reviewed and differences across sectors and sub-
sectors highlighted.  Second, domestic trade policies and their effects are examined in order to 
identify possible anti-export bias in domestic market protection and draw attention to opportunities 
for growth-enhancing reforms.  Third, Morocco‟s recently concluded and prospective bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements are described and assessed, including a quantification of their fiscal 
and economic impacts.  Fourth, the effects of trade policy changes at the multilateral level, notably 
the phasing-out of quotas under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, are analyzed.  And finally, a 
set of priority issues for the attention of policy makers is derived. 
 
2.  OVERVIEW OF TRADE PERFORMANCE 
11. Since 1995, the value of Moroccan exports of goods and services has grown on average by 
6.6 per cent in current USD, roughly in line with world market growth.  Yet, this export growth has 
fallen short of the expansion of foreign sales of some of Morocco‟s main competitors, such as China, 
Poland and Turkey (Figure 2).  These countries have increased their shares in an expanding world 
market, while Morocco‟s share has stagnated at about 0.12 per cent of total world exports. 
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Figure 2:  Growth in Exports of Goods and Services, 1995-2004 (1995 = 100) 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database. 
12. While impediments in the investment climate and the labor market hamper the economic 
development of both exporters and firms that produce for the domestic market, the relatively poor 
export performance over the past decade can be linked to some trade-specific factors.  The latter 
concern both the external economic environment and domestic policy issues.  Developments in 
merchandise trade, export diversification, and services trade are thereby affected in different way and 
to a varying extent. 
2.1  Developments in Merchandise Trade 
13. Merchandise trade has recently been more of a drag than a boon for the Moroccan economy.  
In local currency terms, the value of merchandise exports during the past two years has fallen below 
the level attained in 2002, while the value of imports increased by about 20 per cent during the same 
period.  As a result, the import coverage ratio (i.e. exports as a share of imports) fell to a historical 
low of 55.3 per cent in 2004, after having peaked at almost 74 per cent in 1997. 
14. Morocco‟s main trading partners are located in Western Europe (Table 2).  In 2004, this 
region absorbed more than three-quarters of Moroccan exports and was the origin of more than 60 per 
cent of the country‟s imports.  Trade relationships are particularly intensive with France and Spain, 
which accounted, respectively, for 33 per cent and 17 per cent of Morocco‟s exports and for 18 per 
cent and 12 per cent of all imports.  Outside Europe, significant trade is carried out with the United 
States (4 per cent of both total exports and imports), as well as with China, Russia, Saudi Arabia 
(together about 15 per cent of total imports) and India (3.5 per cent of total exports).  Morocco had a 
merchandise trade deficit with all major regions in the world, except South Asia. 
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Table 2: Structure of Morocco’s Merchandise Trade, 1995-2004 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
 Exports 
 
Imports 
(incl. for re-export) 
Net-Exports 
 
 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 
All Goods          
World 13.9 21.4 21.7 25.6 34.1 39.2 -11.6 -12.7 -17.6 
East Asia & Pacific 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.6 2.4 3.7 -0.2 -1.2 -3.1 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.4 0.6 0.5 2.3 1.8 4.3 -1.9 -1.2 -3.8 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.1 2.0 -0.8 -0.7 -1.1 
Middle East & North Africa 1.2 0.8 0.8 2.9 5.2 4.1 -1.7 -4.4 -3.3 
North America 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.2 2.6 2.0 -1.6 -1.8 -1.0 
South Asia 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 
Western Europe 8.8 16.2 16.2 14.7 20.2 22.0 -5.9 -4.0 -5.9 
Agriculture and fisheries          
World 3.3 3.7 1.5 3.7 3.5 2.9 -0.5 0.2 -1.4 
East Asia & Pacific 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.6 -0.1 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.0 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.8 -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 
Middle East & North Africa 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
North America 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.8 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8 
South Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 
Western Europe 2.0 2.5 1.1 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.4 
Mining           
World 1.3 1.5 1.4 3.8 5.8 5.1 -2.5 -4.3 -3.7 
East Asia & Pacific 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.8 -0.4 -0.3 -1.7 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Middle East & North Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 4.4 2.5 -2.2 -4.4 -2.5 
North America 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2 
South Asia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 
Western Europe 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Manufacturing          
World 9.4 16.2 18.8 18.0 24.6 31.3 -8.7 -8.3 -12.5 
East Asia & Pacific 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.2 2.2 3.6 -1.0 -1.9 -3.1 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 2.3 -1.2 -1.0 -2.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 
Middle East & North Africa 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.6 0.1 -0.8 
North America 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.5 
South Asia 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Western Europe 6.2 13.0 14.6 12.9 18.1 21.2 -6.7 -5.0 -6.6 
Note:  Trade with non-specified countries is included in World-total. Comparisons between years up to 1997 
and afterwards should be treated with care due to methodological changes in Morocco‟s merchandise trade 
statistics. 
Source:  Moroccan Foreign Currency Board & UN COMTRADE database. 
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15. On a sectoral basis, Morocco had a slight trade deficit for agricultural products, and sizable 
ones for mining products and manufactured goods in 2004 (Table 2).  Major agricultural exports are 
fish, fruits and vegetables (e.g. oranges, tomatoes), while substantial amounts of cereals are imported.  
Morocco is one of the world‟s foremost exporters of phosphates, but the resulting foreign sales 
revenues do not suffice to cover the expenses for petroleum and other mining imports.  Within 
manufacturing, exports are concentrated in textiles and clothing, while machinery and equipment is 
the most prominent import category (Figure 3). 
Figure 3:  Sectoral Structure of Manufacturing Trade, 2004 
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Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from the Moroccan Foreign Currency Board. 
16. Morocco‟s agriculture, fisheries and food exports have been volatile over time, reflecting the 
vulnerability of production to climate fluctuations.  A clear trend is nevertheless perceivable that 
points to the declining importance of these exports for the country.  The share of agriculture, fisheries 
and food exports decreased from more than a third of total exports in 1995 to less than a fifth in 2004.  
In parallel, the relative importance of industrial manufacturing exports increased by about 
20 percentage points.  However, Morocco remains more dependent on agri-food export earnings than 
other emerging economies, including China, Poland, Tunisia and Turkey (Tourkmani and Mrani, 
2004). 
17. The disappointing export performance in recent years is to a significant extent attributable to 
adverse external conditions (Rachid, 2004).  Economic growth in Morocco‟s main export markets in 
Western Europe has been relatively sluggish, slowing the demand for Moroccan export goods 
(Figure 4).  The deceleration of economic activity in France, Spain and other countries of the 
European Union since 2000 has highlighted the risks for Morocco of having a geographically highly 
concentrated export structure.  Recently concluded preferential trade agreements with the United 
States and Turkey will tend to contribute to a greater diversification of export markets (see section 4 
below).  Yet, Western Europe will doubtlessly remain the dominant trading partner, so that Moroccan 
exports will continue to be vulnerable to economic downturns in the region to its North.   
18. The heavy dependence on European and notably EU markets suggests that regulatory 
alignment with market and trade standards in Western Europe, as envisaged in the Barcelona process, 
could further facilitate trade and yield significant benefits for Morocco.  In some areas, such as food 
quality and safety, Morocco has already made substantial progress towards meeting EU requirements 
and seems to be in a better position than some of its competitors (Box 1).  Such rigorous pursuit of 
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existing export market opportunities will be a key factor in realizing Morocco‟s potential for sales in 
the EU market. 
  
 
Box 1:  Meeting International Food Safety and Quality Standards 
In response to heightened consumer and agro-industry concerns about food safety and agricultural health, 
developed countries have adopted more stringent sanitary and phyto-sanitary import requirements.  As a result, 
agriculture and food producers from developing countries may experience increasing difficulty of entering 
export markets if they do not comply with international trading rules or voluntary, private standards, such as 
supermarkets‟ assurance schemes.  One industry standard that has assumed significant prominence in 
international agri-food trade is certification for compliance with Euro-Retailer Produce Good Agricultural 
Practices (EurepGAP).  EurepGAP verifies the quality of farm and downstream processing management in a 
systematic and consistent way through a set of protocols and compliance criteria.  
 
In Morocco, the EurepGAP standard is being widely implemented in the agricultural sector in the Agadir 
region.  However, compliance comes at a cost.  Results from microanalysis suggest that for a medium-sized 
tomato farm of 10 ha, the expenses for improving buildings and equipment and the recurring outlays for staff 
training, monitoring, and certification amount to about 8 per cent of farm gate costs.  After post-harvest, 
transport, and marketing costs are added, compliance costs represent about 3 per cent of total export value 
(Aloui and Kenny, 2004). 
 
In many developing countries, adherence to developed country standards is impeded and made more costly by 
the fragmentation of supply chains, dispersion of regulatory responsibilities for food safety across different 
government entities, and lack of financial resources and technical expertise.  Yet, the situation in Morocco 
seems relatively benign.  Benchmarking analysis reveals that in terms of coordination along the supply chain, 
Morocco‟s citrus fruit and tomato sector is significantly ahead of Turkey and reaches best regional practices 
(Spain) in several aspects (see Figure below). 
 
Coordination of the Citrus Fruit and Tomato Supply Chains 
(higher value indicates better quality) 
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Source:  Garcia (2003). 
 
Similar rankings are obtained in other dimensions of export viability.  Concerning safety and quality 
orientation, for example, the presence of specialized quality control staff is the norm in Morocco and Spain, but 
less likely in Turkey where this duty often falls to a general manager.  Most facilities in Morocco have 
automatic sorting and grading lines, while the operational infrastructure in Turkey still relies to a large extent on 
manual labor.  Hence, while further improvements in some dimensions of agri-food management are desirable, 
compliance with international standards does not appear to represent a major impediment for agricultural export 
growth in Morocco. 
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Figure 4:  Economic Growth in Morocco’s Export Markets, 1995-2004 
(per cent) 
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Note:  Average GDP growth in Morocco‟s export markets is weighted by value of merchandise exports. 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
19. In addition to slow growth in its main export markets, Morocco‟s exporters have been 
adversely affected by exchange rate movements.  The strong link of the Dirham to the Euro during a 
time when the Euro strengthened vis-à-vis the US Dollar has resulted in an appreciation of Morocco‟s 
real effective exchange rate relative to some competitor countries whose currencies are floating or are 
more closely linked to the US Dollar (Figure 5).  The resulting loss of competitiveness since 2001 is 
most pronounced vis-à-vis Egypt, but is similarly felt in relation to Tunisia, Poland and China. 
Figure 5:  Real Effective Exchange Rate Developments, 1995-2004 
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Note:  An increase in the real exchange rate means appreciation. 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database. 
20. Not all manufacturing branches have performed poorly, though, over the past decade.  
Indeed, in a number of product lines Morocco has been able to gain world market share (Figure 6).  
However, many of Morocco‟s main exports are in branches that show below average world market 
growth, so that the relative importance of these markets is declining over time.  Moreover, four of the 
product lines that have gained market share, including Morocco‟s top export line, are apparel 
products.  The latter are facing much fiercer competition in international markets since the beginning 
of 2005, as the quotas that regulated supplies of textiles and clothing to developed country markets 
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under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement were phased out (see section 5 below).  Moroccan exporters now 
have to compete head-on with suppliers from other developing countries.  This alteration in the 
competitive environment with increased pressure on traditional exports makes it desirable for 
Morocco to foster new economic activities and diversify production and exports in order to increase 
the resilience of its export earnings. 
Figure 6: Annual Export Growth in Major Product Lines Relative to World Market Growth 
(current USD, per cent) 
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Average Annual Growth of World Exports 
Note:  Time period 1998-2004.  Data reported for the 20 most important HS 4-digit product categories in Morocco.  The size of 
the circle area is proportional to the export value. 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
 
2.2  Export Diversification  
21. Indicators of export concentration, such as the Herfindahl index, suggest that some 
diversification of exports has already occurred since the late 1990s (Figure 7).  While no clear 
tendency is discernable concerning the diversity in exports across countries, the concentration of 
exports by product line shows a slight downward trend over time.  This product-diversification of 
exports is encouraging, although the level of diversification remains lower than in other emerging 
economies, such as China, Poland, and Turkey (Tourkmani and Mrani, 2004).  Hence, in the short 
term Morocco‟s export structure - heavily dependent on agri-food, phosphates and derived products, 
and textiles and clothing - remains vulnerable. 
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Figure 7: Concentration of Exports, 1995-2004 
(Herfindahl index) 
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Note:  The Herfindahl index H is calculated as the sum of the squares of partner country/product line market shares:  H = ∑i si
2 , where si 
represents the share of partner country/product line i in total exports.  Lower values imply less concentration.  Comparisons between years 
up to 1997 and afterwards should be treated with care due to methodological changes in Morocco‟s merchandise trade statistics. 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
22. Comparing the share of a given sector in national exports with the share of this sector in 
world exports yields a measure of revealed comparative advantage.  According to this indicator, 
Morocco is strongest in the production and export of clothing, leather, food and electronic 
components (International Trade Center, 2002).  These sectors are characterized through their 
dependence on large quantities of low-cost, low-skilled labor inputs and their low (or low to medium 
in the case of electronic components) technology contents (Tourkmani and Mrani, 2004).  Value-
added tends to be limited.  In this context, diversification not only serves to reduce the vulnerability to 
market shocks, but could also open the path towards higher value-added production systems.  The 
latter also tend to offer more dynamic perspectives in terms of world export market growth. 
23. One area where Morocco seems to lag behind other countries at a similar level of 
development is the process of “product discovery”, i.e. the uptake and export of products that have 
not been previously supplied by firms in the country.  Some analysts suggest that a slow pace of 
product discovery and diversification is due to market failure (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).  Firms 
underinvest in the discovery process because once the entrepreneur identifies a new profitable product 
for export, others can easily imitate the innovator‟s success, free-riding on the initial investments in 
experimentation and staff training and driving down the innovator‟s profits.  Without government 
intervention to address this market failure, countries are diversifying at a sub-optimal pace.  One 
means for public authorities to overcome this deficiency and accelerate the diversification process 
would be to subsidize the search process, for example by providing infrastructure and fiscal 
incentives to firms that engage in product discovery (Box 2). 
24. Econometric cross-country analysis indicates that product discovery in Morocco is indeed 
relatively low (Klinger and Lederman, 2004).  Over the period 1993 to 2002, there were 19 product 
lines (HS 6-digit level) in Morocco for which export earnings increased from less than 10 000 USD to 
more than 1 million USD.  For comparison, the number of discoveries in Indonesia, Turkey and 
Romania during the same period is reported as 160, 135, and 102, respectively. 
25. Extending the analysis till 2004 increases the pool of new products to 24 (Annex X)).  
Discoveries turn out to be widely distributed across sectors, and some of them have achieved 
considerable economic importance.  Indeed, three new mining and oil refining products each account 
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for more than 1.5 per cent of total exports in 2004.  In the aggregate, new products are responsible for 
more than 9 per cent of Morocco‟s exports.   
 
26. Casting a “wider net” that also captures products with exports between 10 000 USD and 
100 000 USD in 1993 and whose export earnings since then have increased dynamically to more than 
1 million USD, results in a significant rise in the number of discoveries (to 49).  However, the 25 
additionally captured products turn out to be less important in terms of export earnings.  Taken 
together they augment the share of new products in total exports by less than 1.5 percentage points to 
an overall 10.5 per cent. 
It should be noted that the above analysis relates only to the goods sector.  Yet, services 
account for the majority of value-added in the Moroccan economy and parts of the sector have 
developed dynamically over the past years following privatization and de-regulation.  New types of 
services have sprung up and some of these are also serving foreign markets.  The most prominent 
example is the relatively recent emergence of call centers that are serving francophone markets in 
Western Europe and that have become a major contributor to employment generation and export 
earnings. 
Box 2:  Tangier Free Zone 
Morocco has about 70 industrial zones, of which roughly half are operational.  Enterprises in these zones enjoy 
certain infrastructure and fiscal advantages that differ by region and zone.  In addition, there are two operational 
free trade zones (a third one is being created), namely the small, yet established Tangier port zone and the 
relatively new and expanding Tangier Free Zone.  The latter was legally created as a 345-hectare export 
processing zone (EPZ) in November 1997, its rules of procedure were approved in June 2000, and it became 
operational in 2001.  It comprises an industrial in-bond zone and a logistical zone.   
 
In order to benefit from Tangier Free Zone (TFZ) status, enterprises must export all their production.  Services 
firms working with free zone enterprises are also given TFZ status.  Foreign exchange operations for 
transactions abroad by firms established in the TFZ are free.  Goods entering or leaving the TFZ are exempt 
from all duties and taxes on imports, exports, production, movement, or consumption.  Other fiscal measures 
include exemptions from registration and stamp tax on constituting or increasing capital, from taxes on the 
purchase of the land needed for the enterprise‟s investment projects, and from the national solidarity 
contribution.  Moreover, TFZ enterprises are exempt  from the business tax and the urban tax for the first 
15 years, and from the corporation tax and income tax for the first five years.  Between the fifth and the 
fifteenth year, firms pay a corporation tax of only 8.75 per cent (instead of the normal 35 per cent rate) and are 
granted a reduction of 80 per cent on income taxes.  These incentives are similar to the benefits that firms 
receive in export processing zones in other countries, although direct comparisons are difficult. 
 
However, Morocco and other countries will need to adjust the fiscal incentives they grant to EPZ-entreprises in 
order to ensure compliance with their commitments under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.  Developing countries agreed during the Uruguay Round to eliminate specific 
subsidies that are contingent upon export performance by January 1st, 2003.  Countries can continue to exempt 
EPZ-companies‟ exports from indirect taxes (such as value-added taxes), border taxes (e.g. consular fees) and 
import charges, but fiscal incentives have to be abolished or changed to a form that is in conformity with WTO 
rules. 
 
It is expected that the TFZ will eventually attract 1900 new companies and thereby help to reduce the high 
unemployment in the region.  In the first three years, the zone developed dynamically and by April 2005 there 
were 106 enterprises operating in the TFZ and 76 facilities were under construction, had been approved, or were 
being planned.  The 182 TFZ-enterprises are forecast to invest a total of MAD 2.8 billion and will eventually 
create 23 200 jobs.  Almost half of the TFZ-employment will be in the textile, apparel and leather industries and 
a further third in metals, machinery and equipment production (see graph below).  Metals, machinery and 
equipment are thereby overrepresented compared with the sector‟s industrial employment share at the national 
level, while food, beverages and tobacco production and the chemical, rubber and plastic industries are 
currently not as prominent as on the mainland.  
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It is difficult to assess the performance and impact of the TFZ to date, as the zone is still in its build-up phase 
and there are only very limited data on production and exports available.  Morocco‟s statistical authorities only 
report information on trade between the TFZ and the Moroccan mainland, and, to date, do not collect data on 
international transaction involving firms in the TFZ.  In 2004, mainland-Morocco received 0.4 per cent of all its 
imports from the TFZ and sent 0.5 per cent of its exports to the zone.   
 
Distribution of Employment in the Tangier Free Zone 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco
2%
Textile, apparel and 
leather products
47%
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Source:  Société Tanger Free Zone. 
 
The potential role of EPZs as an engine of growth in developing countries has been a much discussed topic.  
Individual country experiences with export processing zones have been mixed and the specific set-up and 
management of the zones seems to be paramount to their success.  Moreover, a business-friendly investment 
climate and good governance seem crucial for a country‟s success in setting up an EPZ.   
 
Export processing zones may make a positive contribution to growth and employment if they manage to attract 
foreign direct investment that is accompanied by technological transfer, knowledge spillovers and 
demonstration effects, which act as catalysts for domestic entrepreneurs to engage in the production of non-
traditional goods or services.  Relatively successful examples in terms of the dynamics of economic activity and 
employment include Honduras, El Salvador, Mauritius, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Sri 
Lanka. 
 
On the other hand, there are a number of failures and the fact that in most cases firms locating in EPZs enjoy tax 
breaks and host countries subsidize infrastructure has been prone to criticism.  It is indeed not clear whether 
such incentives can always be justified on a cost-benefit basis (Madani, 1999).  For example, detailed analysis 
suggests that governmental infrastructure investments in the EPZ in the Philippines have not been justified by 
the returns in terms of employment, tax receipts and foreign exchange earnings (Jayanthakumaran, 2003).  
Moreover, there are often intangible factors that influence the success or failure or free zones.  In the Caribbean, 
the fear of unsteady labor relations is being seen as a reason for the relatively low attractiveness of the EPZ in 
Trinidad and Tobago for investors compared with other zones in the region (Willmore, 1996).  In Africa, many 
EPZs have suffered from lack of socio-political and economic management skills that have not made it possible 
to appropriately address the multiple challenges of EPZ-establishment, such as providing high quality 
infrastructure, government services, and human capital (Watson, 2001). 
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2.3  Developments in Services Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
27. As in many other emerging economies that have been integrating more markedly with partner 
countries, the services sector in Morocco has been developing dynamically, which is reflected in 
services exports.  The latter tripled between 1995 and 2004.  With services imports increasing at a 
more modest pace, net-exports surged from less than 300 million USD to more than 3 billion USD.  
The services trade surplus thereby covered more than half of Morocco‟s merchandise trade deficit in 
2004.  
28. Communications services, including call centers, and tourism have been the drivers of the 
boom (Figure 8).  Indeed, tourism is the second largest source of foreign currency for the country 
after remittances from Moroccan nationals residing abroad (Box 3).  Uncertainties after 
September 11
th
, 2001 led to stagnation in tourism receipts in the following year, but travelers 
recovered confidence over time and the terrorist attacks of May 2003 in Casablanca did not hinder the 
expansionary medium-term trend.  Growth carried through into 2005, with tourism receipts up by 
more than 8 per cent in the first quarter compared with the same period in the previous year. 
Figure 8:  Net-Exports of Services, 1995-2004 (millions of current USD) 
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Source:  International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Statistics. 
29. The government sees tourisms as a key sector for economic development and aims to double 
the number of tourist arrivals to 10 million by 2010.  In order to achieve the required infrastructure 
improvements, it actively seeks investments by foreign tour operators and hospitality companies.  
This endeavor appears to yield some early results, as foreign investment in the sector has shot up 
from less than 2 per cent of inflows to more than 11 per cent in 2004 (Figure 9).  It remains to be 
seen, though, whether these inflows continue in a sustainable manner, as foreign investment has been 
unsteady and frequently linked to single, large-scale investment projects in the past. 
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Figure 9:  Inflows of FDI by Sector and Privatization Receipts, 1995-2004  
(millions of current USD) 
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Source:  Moroccan Foreign Currency Board and Ministry of Finance. 
30. Services exports are often closely associated with foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
Morocco has experienced a significant acceleration of FDI inflows over the past decade.  The stock of 
foreign investments more than quadrupled in current USD, bringing the ratio of FDI stocks to GDP 
from 9 per cent in 1995 to 28 per cent in 2004 (Figure 10).  FDI penetration remains low when 
compared with Tunisia, but the pace of catch-up in Morocco was almost as fast as Poland‟s during 
that country‟s run-up to EU accession.  However, it should be noted that more than a third of 
Morocco‟s FDI stock is concentrated in the telecommunications sector, following the sale of mobile 
phone licenses and the opening of the capital of Maroc Telecom to foreign investors since 1999.  
Other services sectors, such as financial or transport services, have so far not benefitted to the same 
extent. 
Figure 10:  Stock of Foreign Direct Investment, 1995 and 2004  
(per cent of GDP) 
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Source:  National Statistical authorities & UNCTAD, World Investment Report. 
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Box 3:  Emigrant Remittances 
Morocco is the fourth largest developing country recipient of remittances (after India, Mexico and Pakistan), 
with transfers amounting to 4.2 billion USD in 2004.  An estimated 2.5 million Moroccans are residing abroad, 
representing almost eight per cent of Morocco‟s total population of 32 million and affecting perhaps half of all 
Moroccan families.  Contemporary Moroccan migration is overwhelmingly oriented towards the European 
Union, with Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands featuring among the long-established destinations, 
and Italy and Spain among the more recent ones.  In terms of money sent back home, France is by far the most 
important host country, accounting for 42 per cent of total remittances (see figure below). 
 
Country of Origin of Moroccan Emigrant Remittances, 2004 
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Source:  Moroccan Foreign Currency Board. 
The impact of remittances on household income and poverty alleviation can be significant, so that migration is 
often a welcome means of achieving a decent income.  Yet, the question whether remittances have advanced 
Morocco‟s longer term development prospects is controversially discussed (Sorensen, 2004).  Some observers 
have argued that skilled labor resources are being lost, that remittances have been channeled into consumption 
rather than productive investment and that the skills of returning migrants have rarely matched local labor 
market needs.  Others have pointed to veritable booms in the construction and hospitality sectors in some 
emigration-prone regions of Morocco, such as the country‟s North.  Also, the broader professional experiences 
of returning migrants have been seen as a boon for diversifying the domestic economy and for fostering new 
trade links with the former host countries. 
 
Given Morocco‟s population growth and demographic structure, emigration and associated remittances-
transfers will likely remain prominent features of the Moroccan economy.  Indeed, there is evidence that the 
receipt of remittances fosters emigration intentions of other household members.  Therefore, remittances-
transfers may contribute to new flows of migration.  Recent research found this pull-effect to be significantly 
more pronounced for Morocco than for other Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt and Turkey (Van Dalen, 
Groenewold and Fokkema, 2005). 
 
3.  DOMESTIC TRADE POLICIES 
31. There is considerable, world-wide evidence that trade liberalization contributes positively to 
economic performance (Winters, 2004).  Part of the benefits of trade reform depends on other policies 
and institutions being supportive, so that complementary policies should accompany changes in the 
trade regime.  But given that trade liberalization is administratively simple to implement, – indeed a 
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transparent and liberal policy releases administrative resources for other tasks – the case for making 
trade reform part of a pro-growth policy agenda is strong. 
32. Trade liberalization can be undertaken in different settings.  It can notably be pursued through 
unilateral reforms, plurilateral integration, or multilateral trade barrier phase-outs.  An examination of 
tariff reductions since 1980 in the 33 largest developing country importers found that two-thirds of 
the changes in trade-weighted most favored nation (MFN) tariffs were due to autonomous 
liberalization, a quarter to reforms in the context of the WTO, and the remaining ten per cent to 
regional integration (World Bank, 2005a).  Hence, domestic policy initiatives tend to be the main 
drivers for trade reform in many countries. 
33. Morocco has made a number of unilateral changes to its trade regime over the past decade.  
In 1996, the country completed the application of customs tariffs based on the tariffication of 
quantitative restrictions on imports.  Since then, import licensing has only been applied to products 
covered by international agreements or for sanitary or phytosanitary or morality reasons.  Moreover, 
in 2000 the fiscal import levy was incorporated into the customs tariff in order to simplify imposition 
at the border, and tariffs and non-tariff barriers were subsequently reduced.  Also, the computerization 
of customs procedures, the development of customs clearance warehouses, and the establishment of 
on-site customs clearance procedures have reduced border delays and enhanced the transparency of 
the customs process.  As a result, trade transactions costs have declined, even though major 
challenges concerning trade logistics remain to be addressed. 
3.1  Trade Logistics 
34. For a country like Morocco whose comparative advantage is linked to its geography, the 
quality of transport and trade logistics constitutes a central element of competitiveness.  Moroccan 
exporters can only successfully exploit their proximity to the large EU market, if their trade 
transactions costs are indeed lower than those of their competitors.  The importance of well 
functioning links across supply chains is further increased by the ongoing shift to just-in-time 
delivery schedules and the more and more demanding requirements of trading partners concerning the 
timing, reliability and quality of deliveries. 
35. Yet, logistics services are poorly developed in Morocco.  Internal transport is dominated by 
small-scale enterprises that rarely respect common standards of road transport and generally operate 
aged vehicles without transport insurance.  Moreover, there are very few examples of operational 
logistics platforms, as restricted access to land impedes the construction of distribution centers and 
fiscal and regulatory conditions discourage the installation of new service providers (World Bank, 
2005b).   
36. Concerning international trade, recent reforms have led to significant improvements in some 
areas, such as customs administration and air transport.  However, lack of coordination between 
agents along the logistics chain, procedural complexity, and poor information management continue 
to result in delays between entry and exit of imported goods in the port of Casablanca of about 8 days, 
which is substantial.  Also, port charges and handling costs in Morocco‟s main port are very high 
compared with other Mediterranean ports (Figure 11).  A critical issue in this context, both for 
merchandise trade and tourism, is that the sea crossing to Spain is about twice as expensive as sea 
crossings of similar distance from other countries.  Another substantial cost factor for exporters 
relates to the vulnerability of transport to illegal activities, notably drug trafficking and clandestine 
emigration, due to insufficient port security and the absence of secured parking lots at port entrances.  
No less than 0.5 to 1 per cent of shipments are affected with implications for direct costs, delays, and 
the reputation of traders. 
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Figure 11:  Port Charges and Handling Costs per Twenty-Foot Equivalent Container (in Euro) 
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Source:  Chaponnière (2002). 
37. The authorities are aware of the export impediments in the logistics sector.  Improvements 
require major efforts in a number of logistics area and close cooperation between the public and 
private sectors (World Bank, 2005b).  Breaking-up the current monopoly of the port operator and 
increasing competition in the transport sector, as envisaged in recent legislative proposals, would 
represent a significant step towards the objective of reducing trade transactions costs.  In addition, 
land reforms to facilitate the establishment of efficiently-scaled distribution centers in industrial areas 
should become a policy priority. 
3.2  Domestic Market Protection 
38. Morocco grants at least MFN treatment to all its trade partners.  It is using the 2002 version 
of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), and extended the nomenclature 
in 2000 from 8 to 10 digits, which has resulted in an increase in the number of tariff lines from 8 689 
in 1995 to 17 375 in 2005.  All tariffs are ad valorem duties, except for 40 lines that are subject to 
variable levies (depending on the import price and a minimum threshold price). 
39. Since the end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1995, Morocco has 
bound all its duties at ad valorem rates ranging from zero to 380 per cent.  Duties on most non-
agricultural products were bound at 40 per cent, while higher rates prevail for agricultural products.  
Bound tariffs represent the maximum allowable tariffs that WTO members have scheduled as part of 
their multilateral commitments.  However, the latest WTO Trade Policy Review observed critically 
that Morocco is not in full compliance with its international obligations as a large number of its 
applied duties exceed bound rates and that the continuing use of variable levies on selected 
agricultural commidities is not consistent with WTO law (WTO, 2003).  This non-compliance with 
international agreements undermines the credibility of Morocco‟s trade policy and makes the country 
vulnerable to challenges in the context of the WTO‟s Dispute Settlement Mechanism. 
40. Applied tariffs range from zero to 329 per cent, with rates above 50 per cent being used only 
for agricultural products.  For manufactured goods, there are seven non-zero tariff bands (2.5, 10, 
17.5, 25, 32.5, 40, 50 per cent), the most frequently encountered rates being 10, 40, and 50 per cent.  
The simple average tariff (2005 data) amounts to 29.5 per cent (50.6 per cent for agricultural products 
and 26 per cent for manufactures).  Tariff dispersion as measured by the standard deviation amounts 
to 24.2 (43.4 per cent for agricultural products and 17.3 per cent for manufactures).  In addition to the 
import duties, a 0.25 per cent parafiscal import tax applies to imported goods. 
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 Figure 12:  Average Most-Favored Nation Tariffs*, 2004 
Note:  *) including any additional surcharges or fees which are applied only to imports 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from International Monetary Fund.  
 
41.  
42. This degree of import 
protection makes Morocco one of the 
least open economies in the MENA 
region, which, in itself, has relatively 
high average tariffs when compared 
with other regions (Figure 12).  In 
world-wide comparison, Morocco is 
one of the ten most highly protected 
markets, close in its level of 
protection to such inward-looking 
economies as India and Nigeria.  
Many of Morocco‟s tariffs are very 
restrictive if not prohibitive, so that 
little trade in the respective tariff lines 
occurs.  Thus, the trade-weighted 
average of MFN import duties is at 23.5 per cent (2004 data) considerably lower than the simple 
average. 
 
Figure 13:  Average Most-Favored Nation Tariffs by Sector and Stage of Processing* 
Note:  *) MTN-classification, data for 2005. 
Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from Morocco‟s Ministry of Finance. 
43. The highest nominal MFN-
tariffs apply to livestock and dairy 
products.  Morocco‟s tariff structure 
is in general escalatory, such that 
import duties on raw materials are 
lower than those on semi-processed 
products, which in turn are lower 
than the tariffs on finished goods 
(Figure 13).  Tariff escalation is 
particularly pronounced in the 
sectors producing textiles and 
clothing as well as leather and 
footwear.  Producers in these 
sectors have access to inputs at low-
tariff rates, while being able to 
shield behind high import barriers 
for their final products. 
 
44. The high degree of tariff escalation in the textiles and clothing industry is also reflected in 
effective rates or protection (ERPs).  By taking into account protection on both outputs and inputs, 
ERPs provide a better representation of tariff-generated transfers to producers than nominal rates of 
protection, which are based on protection of outputs only.  ERPs exceed nominal rates of protection 
in most sectors, with the ERPs for textiles and clothing being among the highest (Figure 14).  
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Moreover, there are some sectors for which the value-added at world market prices is negative (so 
that ERPs are not defined).  This is for example the case for bovine meat as well as meat products.  In 
other words, these economic activities are highly inefficient to the extent that they are value-
subtracting.  The value of their tradable production inputs at international prices exceeded the trade 
value of their final products.  Because of the distorted domestic price structure, companies in these 
sectors were not necessarily loss-making and could, hence, continue to operate, although their 
activities are clearly representing a waste of resources for the economy overall.  This situation 
suggests that the government should reduce domestic market protection for meat products with a view 
to increase competition in the industry and actively encourage an efficiency-enhancing restructuring 
of firms. 
Figure 14:  Effective Rates of Protection Based on  Most-Favored Nation Tariffs 
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Note:  Effective rates of protection are derived as ERP = VAM/VAW, with VAM and VAW representing the value-added at domestic 
market prices and world market prices, respectively.  Calculations are based on an Input-Output Matrix for 2001, as contained in the Global 
Trade Analysis Project Database.  
Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from Morocco‟s Ministry of Finance and the GTAP database. 
45. Domestic market protection comes at a cost, notably to consumers and firms, including 
service providers that source their inputs domestically.  Also, tariff protection introduces an anti-
export bias.  If firms produce for the export market, they do not receive the same market price support 
that producers for the domestic market enjoy.  Since Morocco can not influence world market prices, 
exporters do not receive the significant policy-generated transfers that producers for the domestic 
market obtain, thus biasing producers‟ decisions against selling abroad.  Indeed, the higher the 
domestic market protection is, the stronger the anti-export bias becomes. 
46. So far the analysis of the import regime has centered on MFN-tariffs, which are applicable 
under normal trade relations.  Yet, not all imports are subject to MFN-duties.  Indeed, Morocco 
operates several customs regimes, such as temporary entry for inward processing and in-bond 
warehousing that allow for the storage, processing, use and movement of goods with suspension or 
refund of all duties and taxes.  Temporary imports are particularly important in the clothing sector, 
where large amounts of semi-finished products are imported and later re-exported after processing.  
Overall, re-exports account for more than a third of the country‟s total exports.   
47. Morocco also grants exemptions and suspension of duties and taxes under the Vienna 
Convention on diplomatic relations, and allows imports of certain agri-food products at reduced rates 
during Ramadan.  Moreover, Morocco has recently concluded several preferential trade agreements 
that grant suppliers from partner country access to the Moroccan market at reduced tariff rates.  The 
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Euro-Med Agreement with the European Union that is being implemented since 2000 is of particular 
importance in this context, due to the significant volumes of trade that Morocco carries out with the 
EU (see section 4 below).  Under the terms of this agreement, bilateral trade in the products covered 
is gradually being liberalized through stepwise reductions in import duties. 
48. Adjustments to the tariff regime since 2000, increases in temporary imports under special 
customs regimes, and the phase-in of the preferential trade agreement with the EU are reflected in 
recent developments in average effective tariff rates.  The latter are the average import duties that 
traders actually pay, and are estimated by dividing total tariff revenue by total import value.  It turns 
out that average effective tariffs fell significantly over the past decade, from almost 14 per cent in 
1995 to less than 8 per cent in 2004 (Figure 15).  This trend is likely to continue, as the 
implementation of the Morocco-EU Agreement proceeds and new free trade agreements, such as 
those concluded with Turkey and the United States come into effect. 
Figure 15:  Average Effective Tariffs, 1995-2004  
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Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from International Monetary Fund. 
 
49. In this context, it is useful to investigate the structure and future development of effective 
rates of protection under the Euro-Med tariff schedule, which is governing imports from the EU into 
Morocco since 2000.  It turns out that ERPs in industrial sectors, such as clothing, increased during 
the early years of implementation of the Euro-Med agreement, before declining since 2003 and 
reaching zero by 2012 (Figure 16).  This temporary increase in protection is due to the timing of the 
phase-out of tariffs for intermediate inputs, which was frontloaded, and that of final products, which 
has been backloaded.  The apparent intention of policy makers that designed the phase-out schedules 
was to generate additional policy-generated transfers to industrial producers during the early phase of 
market opening, in order to ensure political support for the reforms.  The drawback of this approach is 
that the required reform steps since 2003 have become more pronounced.  Moreover, ERPs for agri-
food products, such as fish, increase over time, as these products are not covered by the Euro-Med 
tariff reduction programme, while protection and the domestic market price for intermediates of 
industrial origin is reduced.  Hence, the difference between the high effective agri-food protection and 
(generally) lower industrial protection is being further accentuated through the Euro-Med Agreement. 
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Note:  Effective rates of protection are derived as ERP = VAM/VAW, with VAM and VAW representing the value-added at domestic 
market prices and world market prices, respectively.  Calculations are based on an Input-Output Matrix for 2001, as contained in the Global 
Trade Analysis Project Database.  
Source:  World Bank Staff based on data from Morocco‟s Ministry of Finance and the GTAP database. 
3.3  Tariff Revenues 
50. The opening of the Moroccan market through preferential agreements and related tariff 
reductions has meant that tariff revenues have decreased.  The Ministry of Finance estimates that the 
revenue losses amounted to almost 340 million USD, or a quarter of actual tariff revenues, in 2004.  
More than 82 per cent of the revenue shortfalls are ascribed to the Morocco-EU Agreement, and 
another 14 per cent to the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. 
51. In part as a result of these developments, Morocco‟s dependence on tariffs as sources of 
revenue has declined significantly over time.  The ratio of tariff revenues to GDP fell from 4.2 per 
cent in 1995 to 2.6 per cent in 2004.  
Tariff revenues account now for only 
12 per cent of total tax revenues, 
compared with 19 per cent a decade ago 
(Figure 17).  However, the tax burden on 
imports has not declined to the same 
extent, as lower tariff yields were partly 
compensated for through higher 
revenues from value-added taxes (VAT) 
on imports.  Since 2000, the latter have 
been a more important budgetary item 
for the country‟s treasury than both 
border tariffs and the VAT on domestic 
production. 
Figure 17:  Composition of Tax Revenues, 1995-2004  
Source:  World Bank Staff based on Ministry of Finance data. 
52. The continuing implementation of existing and new preferential trade agreements and deeper 
integration into the world trading system will tend to further erode tariff revenues over time.  The 
fiscal shortfalls would best be addressed by broadening the tax base, reducing tax exemptions, and 
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improving the yield of existing value-added taxes.  Hence, the fiscal reforms pursued over the past 
decade will need to be further deepened. 
4.  REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
53. Morocco is committed to the process of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties with 
neighboring Arab nations.  The country is a member of the Maghreb Arab Union and the Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area.  Moreover, Morocco has signed bilateral agreements with individual trading 
partners, including Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey, as well as regional groups, such as the 
European Union and the European Free Trade Association.  Recently, the country also signed a Free 
Trade Agreement with the United States, thereby becoming the first Maghreb country to do so. 
54. Economic integration through preferential trade agreements (PTAs) can make it possible to 
reap benefits from international specialization, while tailoring the provisions of the agreements to the 
particular needs and adjustment capacities of the countries involved.  PTAs are a means of gaining 
preferential access to foreign markets, and as a consequence are likely to boost trade between partner 
countries.  It has been estimated, for example, that between one-fourth and one-half of the increase in 
Mexico‟s exports to the United States since 1994 can be attributed to preferential access under 
NAFTA (Romalis, 2005) 
55. Moreover, bilateral agreements provide an opportunity to achieve faster and deeper 
integration with partner countries.  Indeed, many agreements nowadays go beyond tariff reductions 
and include provisions concerning investment and services liberalization, movement of labor, and 
institutional convergence.  There is, for example, evidence that the harmonization of investment 
policies, regulatory rules, and institutions in the context of the Association Agreements between the 
European Union and Central and Eastern European countries has significantly expanded foreign 
direct investment and exports in the latter in the run-up to EU accession (Brenton and Manchin, 2003)  
56. However, belonging to several trading arrangements, whose geographical scope, 
liberalization programs and rules of origin provisions differ, can create difficulties for managing a 
country‟s trade regime.  In the private sector, traders have to operate within different trade regimes, 
each with its own tariff rates, regulations and procedures.  One issue of particular concern is the 
potentially significant costs that can result from the need to comply with multiple rules of origin 
regulations (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004), so that firms might be compelled to focus on only certain 
export destinations, given that they might need to produce differently in order to receive preferential 
access in foreign markets.  In the public sector, negotiating and serving different regional initiatives 
can absorb large amounts of scarce administrative resources and occupy policymakers‟ attention to a 
considerable extent.  In addition, judicial conflicts might arise out of the existence of alternative legal 
frameworks and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
4.1  Morocco’s Preferential Trade Agreements 
57. Morocco has concluded a number of integration agreements that create a veritable “spaghetti 
bowl” of preferential trade linkages (Figure 18).  The situation is particularly complex regarding trade 
relationships with Arab countries.  Morocco is a member of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA), which was concluded with the 22 Arab League members and has been effective since 
1998.  The agreement calls for the dismantling of intra-regional tariffs by 2005.  However, in 
practice, not all countries are fully implementing the agreement and duty-free imports are often 
subject to discretionary licensing.  Also, some countries still levy taxes on imports from GAFTA 
members.   
58. In parallel, Morocco has concluded bilateral FTAs with some of its GAFTA partners, notably 
Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia in 1999.  The product coverage of these bilaterals differs as do the phase-
out schedules.  Consequently, it is not always easy for interested parties to identify which duty is 
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levied on products originating in partner countries.  Moreover, Morocco is also a member of the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU), which groups the country together with Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and 
Tunisia, and hence overlaps with GAFTA.  However, AMU is not effectively implemented yet. 
59. In 2004, Morocco signed a bilateral FTA with Turkey.  Once it enters into force, the 
agreement offers Moroccan exporters duty-free access to the Turkish market.  In turn, Morocco is 
opening its domestic market for industrial products to supplies from Turkey over a period of ten 
years.  The agreement is of particular interest to the Moroccan apparel industry, as it allows for 
diagonal cumulation of rules of origin with the European Union, so that Moroccan producers can use 
Turkish textiles in their clothing production, without losing preferential access to the EU market.  It 
thereby removes a disadvantage that Moroccan apparel exporters had in the past vis-à-vis competitors 
in Eastern Europe (Jalal, 2004).  
60. There is indeed growing empirical evidence that rules of origin (ROOs), mainly non 
cumulative rules, may distort trade flows, causing trade diversion and suppression (Gasiorek and 
Augier, 2003). In particular, they foster the use of more expensive intermediate inputs, especially in 
the case of North-South FTAs, like the Euro-Med agreement. Augier, Gasiorek and Lai-Tong (2004) 
show that lack of diagonal cumulation between the EU and South Mediterranean partners in the 
textile and clothing industry may restrict trade between non-cumulating countries by up to 70-80 
percent. In this context, the recent conclusion of the Agadir Agreement and the FTA with Turkey 
represents a positive development since both agreements will apply the Pan European ROO
1
. Goods 
made in any one of the participating countries will be accepted as local in the EU market.  
Figure 18:  Morocco’s Multiple, Overlapping Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  World Bank staff.  
                                                 
1
 In January 1997, European countries have established a common rule of origin, the so-called pan-European system of 
cumulation. It operates between the EU, EFTA countries, the Central and Eastern European Economies and the Balkan 
states. The new arrangement means that a manufacturer can use any originating input (raw material or component) from the 
area in the manufacture of finished products, without running the risk of loosing free trade status if it is exported within the 
area. The basic requirement of this system is that all countries must be linked by preferential agreements so that the system 
would be fully operational, and all agreements must contain exactly the same rules of origin in order to avoid trade 
diversion. The objective of the system is to create an incentive for co-operation between industries and to promote the 
international division of labor. 
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61. Arguably, Morocco‟s economically most important PTAs are those concluded with 
industrialized partners.  In 1996, the country signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the 
European Union, its main trade partner.  This agreement is part of a broader regional integration 
effort that is embedded in the Barcelona Process2. The coverage of the agreement is shallow as trade 
liberalization is limited mainly to industrial goods. It does not contain provisions to liberalize trade in 
agriculture and services. Liberalization in these sectors was left to be decided at a later stage. 
Moreover, the Euro-Med agreement does not cover harmonization of standards as was the case in the 
EU‟s Association agreements with Central and Eastern European countries. These contained 
provisions that statet the need to harmonize standards and provided technical assistance funds to help 
achieve them (World Bank, 2003). 
62. Moroccan tariffs are to be phased-out over a 12-year period, with progressive tariff 
elimination for the most sensitive products. The agreement provides three schedules of elimination: 
(i) immediate for intermediate goods; (ii) over five years for products not produced locally; (iii) and 
over 10 to12 years for locally produced manufactures (commencing four years after the 
implementation of the agreement). This is a relatively extended liberalization schedule compared with 
the pace adopted by Eastern European economies entering into similar arrangements with the EU 
(mostly tariff elimination over five years) or the pace of multilateral liberalization undertaken by 
major Latin American economies in the last decade (Page and Underwood, 1996).  
63. In addition to the Euro-Med agreement, Morocco has concluded a FTA with the United States 
in 2004. Once effective, Morocco is committed to eliminate duties on most U.S. industrial 
products immediately. For agricultural goods, Tariff-Rate Quotas were established while phasing 
out duties on some U.S. (including categories) and more sensitive industrial products over 
periods of from 2 to 25 years. The U.S. will grant immediate duty-free access to Moroccan 
industrial products (Morocco is already beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of 
Preferences). The agreement is expected to give increased export opportunities to Moroccan 
producers in the agriculture and textile industries3 (see Box 4 for more details).  
64. The US-Morocco FTA goes beyond improved market access. It establishes a secure, 
predictable legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Morocco by providing assurances to U.S. 
investors that go beyond those afforded in the 1991 U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(USITC, 2004). For services, Morocco‟s commitments in the FTA are clear improvements over the 
country‟s commitments in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services. Moreover, the FTA 
offers specific improvements with respect to intellectual property rights, customs administration, 
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, electronic commerce, and 
transparency. The FTA also provides dispute settlement procedures, enforcement mechanisms, and 
measures for trade remedies. 
65. Moreover, there are a number of supplementary benefits., First, the agreement is expected to 
lock in and advance important economic reforms underway in Morocco. It would for instance provide 
an opportunity to ensure the full implementation of a new Moroccan law allowing for 100 percent 
foreign ownership of subsidiaries in the insurance sector. Second, the FTA will level the playing field 
with the EU by offsetting the EU tariff advantage in industrial goods and reduce trade diversion. 
Third, Morocco hopes to reap indirect economic benefits, such as becoming a regional production and 
                                                 
2
 Initiated in 1995, the Barcelona Process aims at establishing a WTO consistent Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 
2010, to be achieved by the conclusion of a series of Association Agreements between the European Union and the 
Mediterranean Partners, along with the creation of FTA between southern partners themselves. The stated objective of this 
process is to facilitate the economic development of the Mediterranean countries by encouraging the development of 
competitive market economies, regional integration and cooperation between the Euro-Med countries. 
3
 US-Morocco FTA applies rather restrictive rules of origin for textile and apparel products in comparison to other US FTA. 
NAFTA for instance utilizes mainly a “yarn-forward” standard, while the U.S.-Jordan FTA uses different rules for textile 
and apparel articles, specifying process requirements rather than tariff shifts. 
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trade hub that offers preferential access to both the EU and the US markets.  Morocco is expecting to 
receive a boost in FDI inflows for production that is essentially oriented to these two large markets. 
 
Box 4: Some specific provisions from the US-Morocco FTA 
Agricultural products 
 In the FTA, Morocco granted improved market access to US producers through Tariff Rate Quotas 
(TRQ) and tariff reductions. TRQs have notably been established for U.S. beef and poultry meat, durum and 
common wheat, products related to durum or common wheat, almonds, sugar and some sugar-containing 
products, and apples. In turn, Moroccan exporters of agricultural products will receive preferential access to the 
US market . TRQs apply to Moroccan beef, dairy products, sugar and sugar-containing products, peanuts, 
tobacco, cotton fibers, wine, dried onions and garlic, and various prepared tomato products.  
 
Textiles and Apparel 
 The U.S.-Morocco FTA provides for the elimination of duties over 5 years for most textile and apparel 
articles that meet the agreement‟s rules of origin, requiring that imports of most textile and apparel articles be 
assembled from inputs made either in the United States or Morocco, generally from the yarn stage forward 
(triple transformation: yarn, fabric and apparel) . However The FTA also contains tariff preference levels (TPL) 
that provide duty preferences for specified quantities of certain goods made of yarns and/or fabrics from 
countries other than the United States and Morocco. The FTA also grants immediate duty-free treatment (with 
less restrictive rules of origin) under TRQ to specified quantities of U.S. imports of certain apparel made in 
Morocco.   
 The agreement also contains safeguard measures. A party can increase the duty rate on imports to the 
MFN rate in effect at the time the action is taken or the MFN rate at the date of entry into force of the FTA, 
whichever is lower, but only after investigation by a competent authority. Such safeguard cannot be maintained 
for more than 3 years, with a 2-year extension, and action may not be taken more than 10 years after the 
elimination of customs duties for that good. The party imposing the safeguard would be required to provide 
trade-liberalizing compensation. The parties could still restrain imports in accordance with the WTO Safeguards 
Agreements. 
 
Trade in Services 
 Morocco‟s commitments go beyond the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by 
guaranteeing market access and national treatment to US services suppliers in areas where Morocco previously 
had no obligations. The two parties commit to provide reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to the 
telecommunications network; in banking and securities, U.S. financial service suppliers will have the right to 
establish subsidiaries and joint ventures in Morocco; in insurance, U.S.-based companies will have the right to 
provide insurance on a cross-border basis. Yet, Morocco‟s law prohibiting individuals and organizations from 
investing or maintaining accounts abroad is not to be removed under the U.S.-Morocco FTA. 
 
Transparency 
 Morocco committed to improved transparency, efficiency, and predictability of Morocco‟s laws. It will 
also make its standards system more transparent and more open. Each government must publish its laws and 
regulations governing trade and investment as well as proposed regulations in advance and provide an 
opportunity for public comment on them. Both parties agree to share information to combat illegal 
transshipments of goods. 
 
Source: World Bank staff 
66. Overall, Morocco has signed eleven free trade agreements and seven conditional tariff 
agreements (Table 4).  According to press reports, Morocco is currently considering to sign further 
bilateral agreements with six other trading partners, namely Bangladesh, Brazil, Gabon, Iran, 
Pakistan, and Peru.  The criteria that led to the selection of this economically and geographically 
diverse group of partners are not entirely clear, in particular as trade with the six countries is 
concentrated on a small number of products and trade volumes are relatively low.  Taken together, the 
six partners accounted for merely 2.6 per cent of Morocco‟s imports and exports in 2004 (Table 3). 
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67. Moreover, Morocco‟s production and trade structures and those of the prospective bilateral 
partners are not particularly complementary, with the exception of Bangladesh.  Similarities between 
the export basket of one country and the import basket of another can be analyzed by using the 
bilateral trade complementarity index (Yeats, 1998).  The value of this index can range from zero, 
which represents no complementarity between exports and imports of two countries, to one hundred, 
which implies a perfect match.  The higher the index between two countries, the greater the product 
complementarity. 
68. The trade complementarity index turns out to be low for five of the six prospective FTA 
partners.  For Iran, Pakistan, and Peru, the index value even amounts to less than 10, implying that 
there is a very poor match between Morocco‟s exports and the products that the three countries 
import and vice versa.  Since the existing volume of trade is also rather marginal, the economic 
rationale for fostering closer trade relationships with these countries seems unclear.  
Table 3: Trade Indicators with Selected Partners, 2003 
Agreement/Partner 
(chronological order of PTA 
conclusion) 
Value share 
in total trade 
(per cent) 
Number 
of goods 
imported 
Number 
of goods 
exported 
Trade value 
share of top-10 
products 
(per cent) 
Trade 
complementarity 
index* 
Free Trade Agreements        
Greater Arab Free Trade Area  6 1095 810 66.7   13.1 
Arab Maghreb Union 2 412 897 61.7 10.9 
European Union 65 4517 2274 18.5 17.4 
European Free Trade Area 1.4 1511 384 54.5  14.9 
Egypt 0.6 444 70 54.6 15.9 
Jordan 0.1 40 36 93.6 10.1 
Tunisia  0.5 373 354 41.5 11.4 
United Arab Emirates 0.4 363 248 88.6 n.a. 
Agadir Agreement 1.2 722 523 57.2  10.5 
United States 3.6 1823 499 49.4 17.3 
Turkey 1.1 1250 59 37.1 11.6 
Conditional tariff agreements      
Senegal 0.1 21 381 49.5 6.9 
Saudi Arabia 3.4 245 222 89.8 11.5 
Iraq 0.003 1 3 100 n.a. 
Mauritania 0.1 8 461 41.3 n.a. 
Algeria 0.9 233 202 91.9 7 
Libya 0.5 15 263 85.5 n.a. 
Guinea (2002) 0.1 17 226 73.7 54.5 
Prospective bilateral partners      
Bangladesh 1 34 5 94.9 29.6 
Brazil 2 459 53 79.3 10.1 
Gabon 0.2 7 243 91.5 13.7 
Iran 0.3 133 24 98 7.1 
Pakistan 0.1 224 14 77.2 8.8 
Peru 0.02 16 5 98.1 8.7 
Note:  n.a: no import data at the HS 6 digit level in the UN COMTRADE database 
Source: World Bank Staff estimates 
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Table 4: Main Characteristics of Preferential Trade Agreements Concluded by Morocco 
Agreement/Partner 
(chronological order) 
Signed in 
Effective 
since 
Transition 
period 
Products Liberalization Schedule Rules of Origin 
Coverage of 
Agriculture Services 
Free Trade Agreements 
Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA)*  
1981 1998 
till January 
2005 
Ten per cent annually during 1998-02, 20% in 2002-05. 
Removal of non-tariff barriers, but licensing. 
Regional, 40% Yes No 
Arab Magreb Union 
(AMU) 
1991 not yet - 
Zero tariffs, but uniform compensatory import tax of 
17.5% 
Regional, 60% Yes No 
European Union (EU) 
1996 
2000 12 years  
Three dismantling scenarios: immediate, over 4 years 
for goods not produced locally; over 10 years starting in 
2003 for goods produced locally. 
Bilateral, change in HS4 
heading; Cumulation 
with Tunisia and Algeria  
Some 
To be 
negotiated 
European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA) 
1997 
Bilateral 
arrangements 
No 
Egypt 
 
1998 1999 12 years 
Positive list for immediate phasing-out; over 5 years if 
tariffs < 25%; Tariffs set at 25% if current > 25%; then 
phase-out over last 7 years. 
Bilateral, 40% No No 
Jordan 
 
Tunisia  
1999 1999 10 years 
Four lists for Morocco and three lists for Tunisia; Three 
product groups: zero duty; 17.5% duty; 8 year-phase-out 
Bilateral, 40% No No 
United Arab Emirates 
2001 2003 10 years 
Two negative lists 
Dismantles Arab League tariffs by 10% annually 
Bilateral, 40% Yes No 
Agadir Agreement 
(Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan) 
2004 not yet - 
Zero tariffs when agreement becomes effective 
Agreement will supersede previous bilaterals  
Pan-European  Yes No 
United States 
2004 not yet 12 years Twenty-one different dismantling schedules Bilateral  Yes, TRQs 
Yes, with 
neg. lists 
Turkey 
2004 not yet 10 years Three dismantling schedules 
Cumulation with Algeria 
and Tunisia 
No No 
Conditional Tariff Agreements 
Senegal 1963 1972 - Exemptions with license, one positive list per country Bilateral, 40% No No 
Saudi Arabia 1966 1988 - Exemptions with license No cumulation, 40% No No 
Iraq 1976 1983 - Exemptions with license No cumulation, 40% No No 
Mauritania 1986 1986 - Exemptions with license, one positive list per country No cumulation, 40% No No 
Algeria 1989 1990 - Exemptions with license Bilateral, 40% No No 
Libya 1990 1990 - Exemptions with license Bilateral, 40% No No 
Guinea 1997 2000 - Exemptions with license, one positive list per country Bilateral, 40% No No 
Note:  *) GAFTA comprises the 22 members of the Arab League, but only the 15 more developed countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates) are implementing the Agreement, while the seven less developed ones (Comoros, Djibouti, Palestine Territory, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen) are not. 
Source:  World Bank staff. 
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4.2  Untapped Potentials in Regional Trade 
69. While Morocco is prospecting for integration partners world-wide, there are untapped 
trade potentials in the country‟s immediate vicinity, notably with its neighbor Algeria.  Despite a 
long common land border and a shared culture, the volume of bilateral trade is very low.  This 
lack of integration is a direct result of the political tensions that have prevailed between the two 
countries over the past 30 years and notably the closure of all land border crossings since 1994. 
70. Relations between Algeria and Morocco have been strained since 1975, when Algeria 
supported the Polisario movement, which resisted the Moroccan claim over the Western Sahara.  
The move into the province by Morocco was followed by a freeze in bilateral trade relationships 
(Figure 19).  Over time, political relations improved gradually and tensions subsided, helped, for 
example, by the discussions leading up to the signing of the Arab Maghreb Union treaty in 1989.  
Following UN involvement, Moroccan and Polisario representatives agreed on a UN peace plan, 
and a cease-fire and settlement plan came into effect in September 1991.  The resulting 
improvement in bilateral relations translated into a significant increase in non-oil trade, and, in 
particular, a surge in Moroccan exports to Algeria.  However, the prosperous trading relationship 
did not last long, since the border between the two countries was closed again in 1994, following 
a bomb attack on a hotel in Marrakech that was ascribed to Islamist militants of Algerian origin.  
Since then, trade has been subdued.  Yet, recent political developments provide some hope that 
the border might be opened again in the not too distant future.  There have been talks at a 
ministerial level between Moroccan and Algerian representatives, for example, and King 
Mohammed VI met with President Bouteflika in Algiers during the Arab League Summit held in 
March 2005. 
Figure 19:  Morocco’s Non-oil Export and Import Trade with Algeria 
(Million USD) 
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Source: UN COMTRADE database. 
71. The closure of the border has made transshipment very difficult, long-lasting and 
expensive.  In fact, the only viable way to travel between Morocco and Algeria is by air or ship.  
Yet, with no direct airline and ferry services between the two countries, the only means of trading 
is by passing through third countries, such as France or Spain. 
72. While formal trade is largely subdued, the informal exchange of goods along the border 
has flourished.  There are anecdotal reports that even tractors have been able to cross the formally 
closed border.  This defiance of official regulations undermines the authority of the state and 
fosters the development of illegal networks whose activities might eventually mutate into drug 
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trafficking and weapons smuggling.  Hence, the border closure not only depresses legal trading 
links, but might indeed contribute to the development of criminal activities. 
73. What would happen if the Algerian and Moroccan governments would decide to open the 
border again?  Informal trade would immediately lose at least some of its attractiveness, while 
substantial trade opportunities for formal operators would emerge with positive implications for 
economic growth, fiscal revenues and employment in both countries.  The extent of trade 
relationships during the two year period before the border closure can provide some indication on 
the prospective magnitude of commercial relations.  Morocco‟s exports then were more than 10 
times the level of those in 2000.  
74. One means of quantifying the prospective magnitude of trade flow is to estimate a gravity 
model.  Such models, which have been widely used in trade analysis, are inspired by Newton‟s 
theory of gravity.  They relate potential exports to the relative size of the exporting and importing 
country (e.g. GDP and population), the geographical distance between them, and other country 
characteristics.  Common “other country characteristics” include variables for preferential trade 
relationships and common language.  Such a model was estimated for Morocco (Annex 1) based 
on data on the 2003-pattern of the country‟s exports of goods and tourism services to its different 
trading partners (except Algeria).  The resulting parameter estimates were then used to quantify 
the trade potential with Algeria, assuming that normal trade relationships between the two 
countries were to prevail. 
75. Results indicate that given Algeria‟s GDP, population, distance from Morocco, a 
common language and the bilateral PTA, the normal level of Moroccan exports to Algeria would 
be about 780 million USD for goods and another 220 million USD for tourism services.  Hence, 
Morocco‟s total export potential to its eastern neighbor would amount to about one billion USD.  
This magnitude of exports implies that the establishment of normal economic relationships with 
Algeria would boost goods exports by a factor of 32, and those of total goods and services exports 
by a factor of 42.  In the ranking of Morocco‟s trading partners, Algeria would surge from 
30
th
 place (next to Mauritania and Syria) to 3
rd
 rank, just behind France and Spain.  These 
findings confirm earlier gravity model analysis that found very sizable, yet currently untapped 
export potentials for Morocco vis-à-vis Algeria (International Trade Centre, 2003). 
4.3  Economic and Fiscal Impacts of Preferential Agreements 
76. The current section looks at the potential static impact of different regional trade 
liberalization settings as embedded in the Moroccan trade policy. Static effects refer to the notion 
of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is welfare enhancing and occurs when buyers 
substitute imports from the FTA partner for purchase of domestically produced goods. FTA are 
trade diverting and welfare deterring if there is a shift from lower to higher cost sources of 
imports.  
77. Three regional scenarios have been simulated. The first looks at the impact of the final 
stage of the Association Agreement concluded with the EU
4
. The second includes free trade with 
the US. Finally, the third estimates the supplemental impact drained by free trade with GAFTA 
partners as well as Turkey. The partial equilibrium model was solved using SMART (details are 
presented in annex) and based on Moroccan imports and tariffs as of 2004. 
                                                 
4
 EU25 and EFTA. 
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Figure 20: Import change, three  
preferential agreements scenarios
Euro-Med
79%
US
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Source : World Bank Staff estimates
78. Results indicate that Morocco‟s imports grow overall by 8.4 percent; however, the bulk 
of the increase comes from the expansion of trade with the EU (Figure 20). At the aggregate 
level, trade creation dominates trade diversion
5
. The latter effect is relatively small given that 
more than 50% of Morocco‟s imports already take place 
with Europe. Trade liberalization with the US only 
translates in a three percent increase in imports from the 
US. However, effectively implementing GAFTA will 
generate more trade flows.  
79. Trade diversion happens across the three 
scenarios consistently at the expense of India, China and 
Japan. Imports from each of these three low cost 
economies decrease overall by more than 10 percent 
(Table 5). The decline widens as more partners get a 
preferential access to the Moroccan market.  
80. Results confirm that imports from Europe are 
diverting imports from other cost efficient sources. When 
only free trade with the EU is considered, simulations 
indicate that imports from the US, Tunisia and Turkey 
diminish. However, simulating free trade with these countries revert the impact and imports from 
these new preferential partners grows. While the first scenario indicates a 3 percent reduction in 
imports from the US, an FTA with the US leads to an increase of 8 percent. The magnitude is 
even more important for Tunisia. By including GAFTA partners, imports from Tunisia increase 
by 42 percent, up from a 13 percent drop in the initial scenarios. The concomitant lower increase 
of imports from the EU supports these findings. 
 
Table 5: Import change with selected economies, different 
scenarios 
  Euro-Med 
Euro-Med & 
US 
Euro-Med, US 
& GAFTA 
India -9.3 -9.6 -12.0 
China -8.5 -8.8 -10.4 
Japan -8.6 -9.2 -10.5 
Brazil -3.8 -3.9 -4.5 
    
Tunisia -12.5 -12.8 42.1 
Turkey -9.4 -9.5 29.0 
 Egypt -9.0 -9.2 27.6 
Saudi 
Arabia -2.1 -2.2 18.1 
Algeria -7.8 -7.9 -0.1 
    
Spain 17.0 16.8 15.5 
France 15.6 15.3 14.2 
US -3.0 7.9 7.7 
Source: World Bank Staff estimates 
 
                                                 
5
 Simulations results are based on current level of trade at the HS 6 digit level. Hence, the model accounts 
only for changes in currently traded products. It does not include potential import increase in goods that are 
not traded as of 2004 (e.g., because of inhibiting level of protection) 
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Figure 21: Trade Diversion Effect, regional and 
multilateral trade liberalization, million MAD
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Figure 23: Revenues Losses, regional and multilatral 
Trade liberalization scenarios, million MAD
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
BASE
Year
Euro-Med Euro-Med
& US
Euro-Med,
US &
GAFTA
1/3 cut
Final
scenario
10%
margin
w ith Euro-
Med
Regional Multilateral
Figure 22: Welfare gains,  regional and multilateral 
scenarios, million MAD
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81. The magnitude of trade diversion depends also on the level of protection with the rest of 
the world. Trade diversion is minimized when MFN tariffs deviation from preferential tariffs 
given to partners is the lower
6
. Therefore, two additional scenarios were simulated to measure the 
potential impact of supplemental multilateral trade 
liberalization. The first addresses the option of reducing 
MFN tariffs such as their differential with the EU tariffs 
is limited to 10. The second considers a broader cut of 
one third tariff cut
7
 on all products. 
82. The preferential option translates into higher 
trade diversion than multilateralism. However, it is fully 
explained by free trade with the EU as trade diversion is 
slightly reduced when the regional integration is 
extended to the US and GAFTA members. Limiting the 
MFN differential with EU tariffs helps decrease the magnitude of trade diversion y 16 percent. 
Yet, a much more ambitious multilateral liberalization, including on agricultural products, will 
almost eliminate the trade diversion.  
83. Moreover, Morocco gains more with multilateral 
liberalization. Gains are however small, ranging from 0.4 
to 0.7 percent. This amplitude should be considered as 
the lower limit as the model simulated is partial and 
static. It doesn‟t incorporate gains from increased access 
to partner economies markets as well as dynamic 
positive effects.  
84. With preferential trade liberalization (as 
illustrated by our scenarios), tariff revenues drop follows 
a non-linear path and decrease overall by one-third. 
Given the concentration of imports from Europe, the full 
implementation of the Association Agreement leads to 
the highest loss in revenues of about 22 percent. Further 
removal of tariffs on imports from the US brings the 
revenues down by only three percent. The 
implementation of GAFTA will reduce revenues by an 
additional 10 percent. Complementing the preferential 
agreements with multilateral tariff reductions translates 
in larger losses of revenues, but not exceeding 60 
percent of 2004 tariff revenues.  
Source: World Bank Staff estimates 
85. A number of analyses have also established the superiority of multilateralism versus 
regionalism after estimating the welfare impact of Morocco alternative trade policies. Studies 
usually compare the effects of bilateral arrangements versus a multilateral based liberalization. 
However, these models do not usually capture dynamic gains and long-term adjustments that 
trade liberalization is expected to involve such as economies of scale, technology spillovers 
                                                 
6
 Morocco has already initiated some adjustments on the multilateral basis. In 2004, it homogenized and reduced MFN 
rates on industrial goods for which tariff rates have been dismantled with the EU. The Moroccan government is 
currently in the process of restructuring MFN rates for Textile and Clothing products. MFN tariffs will simultaneously 
be decreased from 50 to 32.5 percent for finished clothing goods, from 40 to 25 percent for fabrics, and from 32.5 to 
17.5 percent for yarns. 
7 A one-third cut is similar to cuts achieved under the Uruguay Round (El Behri and Hertel, 2004) and more modest 
than Doha expected cut (Josling and Hathaway, 2003). 
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through more FDI, restructuring efforts, and productivity gains. Therefore, results should be 
considered as the lower bound of the impact. 
86. Rutherford et al. (1997) are among the first to analyze the impact of the Euro-Med 
agreement on Morocco. They use the Small Open Economy model with data of year 1980. Their 
model allows for perfect competition and fully mobile labor across 39 sectors. Their estimates 
indicate that Morocco gains under unilateral and bilateral trade liberalization with the EU. The 
amplitude differs with different elasticity assumptions and varies between 1 and 2.3 percent. Yet, 
the authors find significant trade diversion costs when only partial liberalization is considered. In 
contrast, complete elimination of tariffs with the rest of the world results in higher welfare gains 
(between 2.1 and 3.1 percent), with only slightly higher adjustment costs. 
87. Based on a similar model, Achy and Milgram (2003) assess the potential effects of the 
EU AA on the Moroccan economy. They find that tariff dismantling vis-à-vis the EU leads to a 
welfare gain of 2.6 percent through the reduction in the output price of goods manufactured 
locally. Yet, production declines at the aggregate level, particularly in metal, mechanical and 
electric manufactures. The authors find that trade liberalization with the EU reinforces the current 
structure of the economy with a strong specialization in labor intensive and low value added 
products such as in textile and clothing. The model however identifies the tourism and other non-
tradable services as benefiting from the liberalization process as demand increases more than 
supply. Output in the tourism sector is expected to grow by 10 percent and employment by 16 
percent. 
88. Augier and Gasiorek (2003) explore the welfare impact of trade liberalization between 
the Southern Mediterranean countries and the EU according to the exact phasing-out schedules. 
They compute a CGEM model with imperfect competition based on 1995 data. The model 
incorporates 10 countries and 11 sectors. The authors find a nonlinear path of welfare changes, 
with the initial process of trade liberalization involving welfare losses. Morocco experiences an 
initial decline in welfare of between 1% of GDP, and then welfare raises the greater are the tariff 
reductions over time8. After full implementation, Augier and Gasiorek find substantial welfare 
gains for Morocco. Under the assumption of unilateral Moroccan trade liberalization, Morocco 
gains amount to 5.4 percent. Gains almost triple when the model simulates the potential effects of 
productivity gains and deeper market access to the EU market (through improved access for 
agricultural products and harmonization of standards and regulations). Even given that scenario, 
the authors find that tariff reduction on a multilateral basis lead to slightly higher gains of 15.6 
percent. 
89. Contrasting with the previous studies, Elbehri and Hertel (2004) find that the EU-FTA 
leads to great welfare losses to Morocco. The authors use a static trade CGE model (GTAP) 
based on 1995 data. Their model assumes imperfect competition and incorporates only non-food 
manufactures. They affirm that losses rise mainly from the unilateral aspect of the trade 
liberalization, reductions in output per firm in industries dominated by scale economies, diversion 
of imports away from non-EU lower cost suppliers, and potentially adverse effects on the 
aggregate demand for labor. They assert that the main effect of FTA is to lock the Moroccan 
manufacturing sector even more firmly into its current pattern of specialization, favoring a few 
labor-intensive sectors. In contrast, multilateral trade liberalization appears to be much more 
favorable to Morocco (30% cut in all tariffs for Morocco, EU and ROW). The most significant 
contributing factor to the positive aggregate welfare gain is the much smaller terms of trade 
losses. Also, this broader framework helps Morocco diversify its industrial productive and export 
base. 
                                                 
8 The path changes at year 5 for Morocco, year 6 for Tunisia, and year 9 for Egypt. 
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90. Three recent studies have focused on the effects of the newly signed US-Morocco FTA. 
Gilbert (2003) uses the GTAP model calibrated for the year 1997, and under the assumption of 
perfect competition. The model only captures the effect of tariff elimination on manufactures as 
the GTAP database used in the study does not incorporate information about non-tariff barriers 
and service protection. Gilbert finds that Morocco looses a total of $293 million (0.3 percent of 
GDP) by implementing a FTA with the US, $115 million from revenues currently collected on 
US products and $177 million as a result of increasing imports from the US rather than from 
other less costly partners. This result indicates a dominance of trade diversion. However, the 
author notes that if increased US exports to Morocco reduces margins of preference enjoyed by 
countries under preexisting preferential agreements, the net trade diversion effects reflected in the 
simulations can be viewed in a more positive way. On the contrary, Morocco gains from 
multilateral trade liberalization (2.8 percent of GDP). 
91. Ait El Mekki and Tyner (2004) use the 1997 GTAP database and differentiate twenty 
economic sectors and four regions (Morocco, USA, European Union and the Rest of the World). 
Their analysis concentrates on the impact on the most sensitive sector that is agriculture. They 
find that Morocco neither gains nor loses in aggregate from the agreement. There is a very small 
increase in real GDP, and a very small decrease in welfare. They note that losses in agriculture 
are real, but small. The largest import changes and production decline are in red meat and wheat, 
which are both currently highly protected in Morocco. Exports increase to all three regions in all 
products but predominantly in wearing apparel and other food. Multilateral liberalization is much 
more profitable to Morocco. Moroccan nominal GDP increases by 14.6 percent and welfare by 
7.8 percent (4.3 percent in allocative efficiency and 3.2 percent in improving terms of trade). 
Interestingly, total exports to the US shrink in that scenario while those to the rest of world 
increase the most. 
92. Andriamananjara And Tsiagas (2004) use the same framework than in the previous study. 
They simulate 65 separate simulations for potential US FTA. For each one, they analyze the 
impact of a reciprocal and complete removal of tariffs between the US and the partner country. 
Results indicate that Morocco is among the 10 biggest losers from a FTA with the US, along with 
Japan, rest of North Africa and rest of Middle. Welfare losses amount at 0.3 percent of GDP. 
Morocco loses mainly from losses in terms of trade. Simulations of complete removal of tariffs 
by all countries lead to welfare gains to Morocco at around 2.2 percent of GDP. 
93. Brown et al. (2005) estimate the potential impact of the US FTA on the Moroccan 
economy using a model with different market behavior assumptions than the GTAP. They use the 
Michigan CGE model, allowing for imperfect competition in non-agricultural sectors. The 
database is calibrated for 1997 but projected to the year 2005. They find fairly small effects of the 
bilateral elimination of barriers on agricultural products, manufactures, and services, given 
especially the comparatively small size of existing trade between the two economies. Morocco‟s 
unilateral trade liberalization with the rest of the world would nonetheless double welfare gains 
for Morocco compared to the gains attained with a bilateral FTA ($1.7 billion compared to $0.9 
billion). 
94. The review of the literature indicates that in a comparative static framework, FTA do not 
offer significant gains for Morocco. The impact on growth is not sufficient to speed-up the 
process of income convergence with Western economies. One of the possible reasons for such 
low effect is that great benefits usually come from increased market access. Yet, The Association 
Agreement with the EU is more about Morocco tariff dismantling and the current level of trade 
with the US is very low
9
. In the case of Morocco, most of the gains will come from the policy 
                                                 
9
 These models only predict trade expansion or diversion for existing products as it is difficult to predict 
such developments for new products and services. 
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restructuring that will be undertaken as part of the FTA. This will render the Moroccan economy 
more efficient and more capable of competing in the global economy. Also, the FTA are expected 
to encourage more US and other foreign direct investment in Morocco, which is not captured in 
the comparative static analyses. 
Table 6: Summary of selected literature on the welfare impact of Morocco FTA 
 
 Base year Model Competition Countries 
Regions 
Sectors Tariffs 
elimination 
Welfare effect, % GDP 
Unilateral Bilateral Multi. 
FTA with the EU          
Rutherford and  al, 
1997 
1980  SOEa Perfect 3 39 All 1% to 2% 1.2% to 
2.3% 
2.1% 
to 
3.1% 
Achy and Milgram, 
2003 
? SOEa Perfect 3 15 Agreement 2.6% - - 
Augier and 
Gasiorek, 2003 
1995 CGEMb Imperfect 10 11 Agreement 5.4% 13.9% 15.6% 
ElBehri and Hertel, 
2004 
1995 GTAPc Imperfect 3 28 Non-food 
manuf. 
- 1.2% to 
- 5.9% 
 1.3% 
to 
2.0% 
FTA with the US          
Gilbert, 2003 1997 GTAPc Perfect 23 19 Manuf. - - 0.26% 2.8% 
Ait El Mekki and 
Tyner, 2004 
1997 (tariffs 
updated) 
GTAPc Perfect 4 20 All - - 0.1% 7.8% 
Andriamananjara  
And Tsiagas, 2004 
1997 GTAPc Perfect 65 4 All  - 0.3% 2.2% 
Brown et al., 2005 1997 
(projected to 
2005) 
Michigan Imperfect 22 18 All. - 2.7% 5.1% 
a- SOE: Small Open Economy; b- CGEM: Computable General Equilibrium Model; c- GTAP: Global Trade Analysis Project; 
Source: World Bank Staff 
 
5.  IMPLICATIONS OF TEXTILES AND CLOTHING MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
95. The abolition of quantitative restrictions against exports of textiles and clothing from 
developing countries that came into effect on January 1, 2005 will have important implications 
for major exporters, such as Morocco.  From 1974 to 1994, international trade in textiles and 
clothing was governed by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), which provided for the application 
of selective bilateral quotas when surges in imports of particular products caused, or threatened to 
cause, serious damage to the industry of the importing country.  In essence, developing country 
exporters agreed under the MFA to quantitative constraints on their supplies to selected 
developed country markets, notably Canada, the European Union, Norway, and the United States, 
in order to avoid a protectionist backslash in the latter.   
96. The MFA represented a major departure from basic GATT rules and, in particular, the 
principle of non-discrimination.  The distortions it introduced into the international trading 
system became more and more pronounced over time, as comparative advantage in textiles and 
clothing production shifted, raising the need for reforms.  In 1994, WTO members concluded the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as a transitional arrangement for the period from 
1995 to 2004 that committed developed countries to progressively integrate parts of their textile 
and clothing imports into the GATT framework, and enlarge remaining quotas (until they were 
removed) by increasing annual growth rates at subsequent liberalization stages.  The 
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implementation of the ATC was “backloaded” in the sense that the most stringent restrictions on 
textile and clothing trade were only lifted during the final integration stage, i.e. at the end of 
2004. 
97. With textiles and clothing accounting for about 17 per cent of industrial value-added, 
34 per cent of merchandise exports, and 42 per cent of industrial employment, quota abolition 
could have major impacts on the Moroccan economy.  Morocco is less exposed to changes in 
world textiles and clothing markets than Tunisia and Turkey, but more so than Egypt, China, and 
Poland, for example (Figure 24).  Quantitative assessments of the phase-out of MFA-quotas 
consistently indicate considerable changes in the patterns of textiles and clothing production and 
trade (Walkenhorst, 2005).  In particular, there is pressure for production in developed countries 
to be replaced by imports from developing 
countries.  At the same time, competition 
between developing country suppliers is going 
to intensify substantially, as the previously 
quota-secured export markets become 
contestable.  As a result, world market shares 
will shift and supplies will likely become more 
concentrated on a smaller number of textiles 
and clothing producing countries. 
 
 
Figure 24:  Share of Textiles and Clothing in Total Exports, 2003 (in per cent) 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
98. For developing countries, the welfare effects of ATC-reform are mixed.  On the one 
hand, there is the loss of quota rent in export markets that were previously constrained.  On the 
other hand, exporters could potentially gain in efficiency to the extent that they shift resources 
into textiles and clothing, assuming they have an ex post comparative advantage in these 
industries.  The latter will in most cases be based on low labor costs, as apparel production, in 
particular, is a labor-intensive activity. 
99. Total labor costs in Morocco‟s textiles and clothing industry amounted to about 
2.50 USD/h in 2004.  They were thereby lower than those in southern and central European 
countries, such as Portugal and Poland, and roughly on par with the labor-related expenses of 
other Mediterranean textiles producers, such as Turkey and Tunisia.  However, Moroccan labor 
costs are a multiple of those in eastern and southern Asia, including China, India, and Pakistan 
(Figure 25).   
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Figure 25:  Labor Costs in the Textiles and Clothing Industry, 2004 
(USD/hour) 
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Source:  Werner International (2005). 
World-wide comparable information on labor productivity in the textiles and clothing 
industries is not available, but it seems questionable whether higher productivity in Morocco 
could currently offset the country‟s labor cost disadvantage vis-à-vis eastern and southern Asia.  
Indeed, labour productivity is below that of some of Morocco‟s competitors in the Pan-
Mediterranean (Figure 26).  Some analysts estimate that better workshop organization, 
investment in modern equipment, and the adoption of quality management techniques could 
result in productivity gains of about 25 per cent (Institut Francais de la Mode, 2003).  But even 
realizing these gains would hardly be enough to offset the labor cost disadvantage vis-à-vis Asian 
producers.  Hence, competing on price, while maintaining the acquired level of social standards 
in Morocco, is very difficult for Moroccan exporters. 
Figure 26:  Labor Productivity in Apparel Production 
(Minutes per unit) 
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Source:  Transtec (2003). 
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100. Indeed, data on unit import values show that, for example, Chinese shipments of apparel 
products into the European Union are very competitively priced.  In the three categories t-shirt, 
trousers, and women‟s blouses, which are of importance for Morocco, Chinese exporters charge 
lower prices than Moroccan suppliers.  In the case of trousers, the products from China cost less 
than half as much as those originating in Morocco (Figure 27).  However, the unit value data 
should be interpreted with care, as the product categories in the EU‟s SIGL database are broadly 
defined and the characteristics and quality of the imports are not necessarily comparable. 
 
Figure 27:  Unit Values of Apparel Imports into the European Union, 2004 
(Euro/unit) 
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Note:  Latest data available (May 2004). 
Source:  European Union SIGL database. 
101. As international cost leadership is difficult to obtain for Moroccan apparel producers due 
to their labor cost disadvantage, exporters have to try to differentiate their products and compete 
on other product attributes, such as quality, flexibility and speed of delivery.  The structure of 
Morocco‟s textile and clothing exports is in fact significantly different from that of most 
exporters in Asia.  In other words, the apparel products that Morocco exports are not the same as 
those originating in, for example, China, India or Pakistan.  Export similarity indices suggest that 
Morocco‟s main competitors in the EU market are other suppliers in the Mediterranean (Tunisia, 
Turkey) or in eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania), while Sri Lanka is the only Asian country that 
has an export structure that is highly similar to Morocco‟s (Figure 28).  However, the structure of 
countries‟ exports might well change after the MFA phase-out, as some categories of products 
were in the past more constrained by export quotas than others. 
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Figure 28:  Similarity between Morocco’s and Other Countries’ Textiles and Clothing 
Exports to the EU (Export Similarity Index) 
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 Note:  The export similarity index S is calculated as S = ∑i MIN[(Xa,i/Xa), (Xb,i/Xb)], where Xa,i and Xb,i are the exports of product i 
from countries a and b, and Xa and Xb are the respective total exports.  The index ranges from zero to one, with a higher value 
indicating greater similarity of export structures.  Calculations are made at the HS 6-digit level for 2002. 
Source:  World Bank (2005b). 
102. There is often considerable flexibility in the apparel sector to switch between 
product categories in response to market signals.  Indeed, Morocco‟s export structure has 
changed significantly over the past decade.  Some categories, such as women‟s or girls 
suits, have experienced a strong expansion in absolute and relative terms, while others, 
such as men‟s and boys‟ overcoats, show a marked contraction (Table 7).  
103. So while structural adjustment is nothing new for textiles and clothing producers in 
Morocco, there is considerable uncertainty over the future of the sector in the context of more 
direct competition from eastern and southern Asian exporters since the beginning of 2005.  
Indeed, in the first quarter of 2005, Morocco‟s exports of suits and underwear fell in local 
currency terms by 15 and 21 per cent, respectively, compared with the first three months in 2004.  
In parallel, China‟s textiles and clothing exports surged, with total shipments up by 28 per cent in 
January and February 2005 compared with the same period in 2004.  As a result, China has been 
able to increase its market share in both the EU and the US markets and these gains have mainly 
been achieved at the expense of other developing country exporters. 
104. It is unclear to what extent the early adjustments following the MFA phase-out will be 
indicative of longer term trends.  On the one hand, there are reports of large-scale stockpiling of 
textiles and clothing in China at the end of 2004 in anticipation of the quota removal.  These 
horded supplies have reached the Western European and Nothern American markets during the 
first quarter of 2005 and led to quick, but perhaps only temporary, gains in China‟s market share.  
On the other hand, there is uncertainty about whether and to what extent the United States and the 
European Union will invoke safeguard action, such as introducing anti-dumping duties, against 
Chinese exports, which might have led some retailers to avoid sourcing textiles and clothing 
supplies in China so far.  Yet, once this uncertainty is resolved, they might try to explore new 
supply sources in East Asia. 
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Table 7:  Structural Changes in Morocco’s Textile and Clothing Exports, 1995-2004 
HS-4 Product description 
Increase in exports 
Share of T&C 
exports (%) 
Current 
USD (‘000)  
% 1995 2004 
Ten product lines with the biggest export increases     
6204 Women‟s or girls suits, ensembles, not knitted 375018 62 22.9 28.3 
6109 T-shirts, singlets, tank tops, knitted or crocheted 189853 142 5.0 9.3 
6212 Bras, girdles, garters, etc. knitted or not  78472 78 3.8 5.2 
6108 Women‟s or girls slips, pjs, etc. knitted or crocheted 60248 135 1.7 3.0 
6211 Track suits, ski-suits & swimwear, not knitted etc.  53266 57 3.5 4.2 
6110 Sweaters, pullovers, vests, etc. knitted or crocheted  30216 15 7.6 6.7 
5209 Woven cotton fabrics, nu 85 % cot, wt ov 200  25016 441 0.2 0.9 
6106 Women‟s or girls blouses & shirts, knitted or crocheted 22085 67 1.2 1.6 
6107 Men‟s or boys‟ underpants, pjs, etc., knitted or crocheted 18994 71 1.0 1.3 
6207 Men‟s or boys‟ undershirts etc, not knitted or crocheted 14098 142 0.4 0.7 
Ten product lines with the biggest export decreases     
6114 Garments nesoi, knitted or crocheted -4175 -43 0.4 0.2 
6210 Garments, of felt etc, or fabric impregnated  -4326 -17 1.0 0.6 
6209 Babies‟ garments & accessories, not knitted or crocheted -4699 -22 0.8 0.5 
5701 Carpets & other florr coverings, knotted  -5371 -25 0.8 0.5 
6101 Men‟s or boys‟ overcoats, knitted or crochet  -8025 -63 0.5 0.1 
6103 Men‟s or boys‟ suits, ensembles etc, knitted or crocheted -11381 -30 1.4 0.8 
6205 Men‟s or boys‟ shirts, not knitted or crocheted  -13876 -8 6.3 4.4 
6111 Babies‟ garments & accessories, knitted or crocheted  -19417 -52 1.4 0.5 
6112 Track suits, ski-suits & swimwear, knitted or crocheted -19742 -47 1.6 0.6 
6201 Men‟s or boys‟ overcoats, cloaks etc, not knitted etc. -21245 -43 1.9 0.8 
 All textiles and clothing 819376 31 100.0 100.0 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
 
105. Analysis using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) computable general 
equilibrium model suggests that Morocco will in the longer term experience a reduction in 
textiles and clothing exports, respectively, of 11 and 18 per cent as a result of MFA phase-out 
(UNECA, 2005).  This fall in foreign sales will lead to annual economic welfare losses of about 
200 million USD or 0.22 per cent of GDP.  Similarly sized income reductions are projected for 
other countries in North Africa and the Middle East, while producers in China and consumers in 
the European Union and the United States are the main beneficiary groups from the liberalization 
of world textiles and clothing trade.  The UNECA-results are broadly confirmed by Manole 
(2005), who uses a more detailed country breakdown in his GTAP-simulations (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29:  Model-based Estimates of Economic Welfare Effects of MFA Phase-out 
(millions of USD) 
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Source:  Manole (2005), UNECA (2005a). 
106. Manole (2005) also reports estimates of the labor market impact of quota removal.  His 
findings suggest that 15-16 per cent of all unskilled workers in the Moroccan textiles and clothing 
sector will lose their employment.  This significant impact could become even more pronounced 
over time, if the more competitive market environment induces textiles and clothing producers to 
scale back their investments.  For example, a study of the Tunisian textiles and clothing sector 
that uses a dynamic general equilibrium model and thereby takes investment linkages into 
account found that the adverse employment effects could deepen considerably over time 
(Marouani, 2005). 
107. Any significant job losses in the textiles and clothing sector will have important 
implications for Morocco‟s economy, but also for society at large.  Morocco‟s export industries 
tend to employ a larger share of female employees than import-competing sectors (Figure 30).  
Indeed, in the highly export-oriented clothing sector, more than 80 per cent of all employees are 
women.  Hence, any negative changes in export performance and employment scale-downs will 
more than proportionally affect the female population, with implications for gender balance and 
the pace of societal modernization.   
Figure 30:  Exports and Female Employment 
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Source:  Moroccan Ministry of Industry. 
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108. What can policy makers do to avert or at least contain the losses of employment and 
income that loom in the textiles and clothing industry as a result of low-cost competition from 
East Asia?  One route would be to foster a shift towards higher quality and higher value-added 
production.  Currently, a large share of Morocco‟s production is merely subcontracting work for 
European partners and the value that is added to intermediate inputs is relatively low (Figure 31).  
Hence, developing a more sophisticated production system with a larger degree of vertical 
integration could be a promising means to defend market share and revenues (Institut Francais de 
la Mode, 2003).  The recently concluded free trade agreement with Turkey is an important step in 
this direction (see section 4), as it makes it possible for Moroccan clothing producers to source 
lower-cost textiles inputs in Turkey while still respecting the rules of origin requirements of the 
European Union.  Yet, moving towards vertically more integrated production structures and 
higher value-added products requires more enterpreneurial initiative and additional operational 
capital than is currently available in many of Morocco‟s small and medium-scale firms.  Also, 
many other textiles and clothing producing countries are pursuing a similar strategy, so that 
competition in higher end product categories is bound to increase. 
 
Figure 31:  Structure of Production Costs in the Clothing Industry 
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Note:  Data for 2001. 
Source:  Global Trade Analysis Project database. 
109. One uncontestable advantage that Morocco has over its competitors is its proximity to the 
large Western European market.  Hence, the country can compete on attributes such as speed of 
delivery and rapidity of response that more distant suppliers will find hard if not impossible to 
match.  However, using and exploiting this generic advantage requires a well performing logistics 
chain, which currently doesn‟t seem to be in place.  Indeed, insufficient reliability of deliveries is 
cited by apparel buyers in the European Union as the second most significant weakness of 
Morocco‟s textiles and clothing industry, next only to the country‟s limited offer of diversity in 
fabrics (Figure 32). Policy reforms, as outlined in World Bank (2005b), to foster competition in 
transport and port services and to establish modern logistics providers and distribution centers 
should be an integral part of any strategy to strengthen the competitiveness of Morocco‟s textiles 
and clothing industry.  Indeed, as long as Morocco remains highly dependent on subcontracting 
work for European clothing producers and imports a large share of its intermediate inputs, 
reducing trade transactions costs and delivery uncertainties appears to be the prime means of 
quickly improving the prospects of the sector. 
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Figure 32:  Survey Results on Weaknesses of Morocco’s Textiles and Clothing Sector 
(Share of EU buyers in survey who cited the criteria, in per cent) 
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Source:  Institut Francais de la Mode (2003). 
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6.  SUMMARY OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding discussion provided a detailed account of Morocco‟s trade policy situation 
and export performance in the context of the country‟s economic growth and poverty reduction 
agenda.  Several issues were thereby highlighted in the different sections of the chapter that 
warrant the attention of the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco (GoKoM).  The most 
pertinent ones are summarized in Table 8: 
Table 8:  Policy Recommendations Matrix 
Issue Action recommended 
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Developments in merchandise trade     
 Given Morocco‟s strong dependence on the EU market for 
exports, the GoKoM should actively pursue the 
harmonization of the country‟s domestic product standards 
in key export sectors, such as agri-food, textiles and 
clothing, and electrical and mechanical equipment, with 
those prevailing in the EU.  These standards should be 
rigorously enforced in order to make it possible for 
Morocco to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement with 
the Union, which would greatly facilitate trade. 
 X X Medium term 
 GoKoM should closely monitor real exchange rate 
developments and foster a policy of real wage moderation 
in order to avoid a further deterioration of the country‟s 
international competitiveness. 
X   
Short & 
medium term 
Export diversification     
 The recent conclusion of trade agreements with several 
partner countries gives Moroccan exporters preferential 
access to previously underexploited markets, such as those 
in the United States and Turkey.  GoKoM should, in 
partnership with the private sector, actively support the re-
orientation of exporters towards these new markets in order 
to achieve a greater diversity of exports.  The support 
could, for example, take the form of establishing trade 
missions abroad. 
X X  Short term 
 The incentives given to firms in Morocco‟s export 
processing zones, such as the Tanger Free Zone, should be 
brought into line with the new multilateral requirements.  
The process of incentive alignment and re-
instrumentalization should start as soon as possible in 
order to enable a smooth transition to the new regime. 
 X X Short term 
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Developments in services trade and foreign direct investment     
 The liberalization process pursued in the communications 
sector should be extended to other services sectors, 
including transport, in order to foster competition and 
increase the efficiency of service providers.  Low-cost 
service operators can generate substantial export revenues, 
as demonstrated by Morocco‟s call center industry, and 
reduce input costs for manufacturing firms, which as a 
result will become more competitive in international 
markets. 
 X  Medium term 
 GoKoM should ensure that an appropriate business 
environment for the planned expansion of the tourism 
sector, including with respect to access to land, is put into 
place. 
 X  Medium term 
 The low level of FDI inflows outside of privatization-
related receipts indicates that foreigners do not perceive 
Morocco has an attractive location for investments.  
GoKoM should remove any remaining impediments to FDI 
in order to attract larger amounts of much needed capital 
and related managerial and technological expertise.  
Measures should include the elimination of discretionary 
scope of tax authorities and the active suppression of 
informal activities in order to create a level playing field for 
foreigners. 
X X  Medium term 
Trade logistics     
 Trade transactions costs should be reduced by increasing 
competition in port management and in the transport 
sector, as envisaged in recent legislative proposals. 
 X  Short term 
 GoKoM should gradually tighten standards for operators in 
the transport sector in order to improve the quality and 
reliability of transportation services. 
X X  Medium term 
 In addition, land reforms to facilitate the establishment of 
efficiently-scaled distribution centers in industrial areas 
should become a policy priority. 
 X  
Short to 
medium term 
Domestic market protection     
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 GoKoM should ensure full compliance with Morocco‟s 
obligations under WTO Agreements, including with respect 
to tariff bindings and variable levies, in order to maintain 
and enhance the credibility of its trade policy. 
 X X Short term 
 GoKoM should reduce tariff dispersion and the currently 
high degree of tariff escalation across different stages of 
transformation, which gives rise to very high effective rates 
of protection.  The latter, in turn, make it possible for 
companies to avoid efficiency-enhancing changes in 
operations. 
 X  Short term 
 Urgent action is required in sectors, such as meat 
processing, that show negative value-added at international 
prices.  Tariff protection should be substantially reduced 
with a view to foster a restructuring or close-down of 
value-subtracting firms. 
 X  Short term 
 The high effective rates of protection for agricultural and 
food products are bound to increase further as tariffs on 
industrial inputs are phased out under the Euro-Med 
Agreement.  GoKoM should embark on a medium-term 
strategy of agricultural tariff reforms that gradually increase 
the exposure of farmers and agro-processors to 
international market forces. 
 X  Medium term 
Tariff revenues     
 GoKoM should replace the loss of tariff revenues due to 
market openning by broadening the tax base and reducing 
currently existing tax exemptions, notably with respect to 
value-added taxation. 
 X  
Short to 
medium term 
 Income taxation should also be broadened by making the 
tax system applicable to all sectors in the economy, 
including agriculture. 
 X  Medium term 
Preferential trade agreements     
 GoKoM should try to harmonize the product coverage of 
PTAs and their rules of origin provisions in order to 
increase transparency and make it easier for private sector 
operators to deal with the different agreements. 
  X Medium term 
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 Regional trade initiatives, such as the Arab Maghreb 
Union, should be revived based on the existing judicial and 
institutional framework, but without derogations such as 
the licensing requirements that have up to now undermined 
effective implementation. 
  X 
Short & 
medium term 
 International experience shows that preferential agreements 
which involve institutional convergence, harmonization of 
standards, and services trade liberlization yields very 
substantial benefits over time.  GoKoM should aim to reap 
these benefits by pursuing such “deep integration”.  
  X Medium term 
Untapped regional trade potentials     
 GoKoM should continue its political dialogue with Algeria 
with a view to re-establish normal economic relations and 
re-open land border crossings, which promises substantial 
economic benefits. 
X  X 
Short & 
medium  term 
Economic and fiscal impacts of preferential agreements     
 GoKoM should fully implement its bilateral agreements, 
including provisions on agriculture and services contained 
in the free trade agreement with the United States. 
  X 
Short to 
medium term 
 The currently largely excluded agriculture and services 
sectors should be brought into current and potential future 
new agreements in order to reap the benefits that an 
openning of these sectors promises to provide for the 
economy at large. 
 X X Medium term 
 GoKoM should reduce its tariffs with partners with whom 
it does not have a preferential agreement in order to contain 
the diversion of trade flows and the associated  economic 
costs. 
 X  Short term 
Implications of textiles and clothing market liberalization     
 Due to the large dependence of Morocco‟s clothing sector 
on imported intermediate inputs and the large share of 
production that is exported, an effective trade logistics 
system is of utmost importance for the prospects of the 
textiles and clothing industry. 
 X  
Short to 
medium term 
 GoKoM should support private sector efforts to upgrade 
quality and increase value-added by fostering 
improvements in professional education and training. 
X X  Medium term 
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 Moreover, GoKoM should assist private sector initiatives 
that aim at coordinating and bundling supplies of small or 
medium-scale producers in order to achieve the minimum 
required scale in large markets, such as the one in the 
United States. 
X X  Medium term 
      
Note:  Time frame specifications:  Short term – within 12 months, Medium term – within 2 years, Longer 
term – 2 to 5 years. 
Source: World Bank staff. 
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ANNEX 1: A GRAVITY MODEL TO QUANTIFY MOROCCO’S EXPORT POTENTIAL 
 
In order to determine the trade potential between Morocco and Algeria in case it were 
possible to come to a political understanding that would lead to the opening of the border and the 
resumption of normal economic relations, a gravity model was estimated.  The earlier discussion 
of trade-determining factors (see section 4.2) suggests the following economic relationship: 
(1) Ln MARjEXP  = a1 Ln Yj + a2 Ln Pj + a3 Ln 
MAR
jDIST + a5PTA + a6 ComLang + εij 
 
where EXP is Morocco‟s exports of goods and services (tourism receipts ) to country j, 
jY and jP are GDP and population of country j, ijD  is the geodesic distance
10
 between Morocco 
and country j, MFN is the MFN rate levied by the importing country, PTA and ComLang are 
binary dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the country is involved in a preferential trade 
agreement with Morocco and shares a common language. It takes the value zero otherwise.  
A characteristic of the data set is that countries to which Morocco does not export to are 
included in the regression sample.  Hence, the dependent variable, Moroccan exports, is censored 
at the lower limit.  About 20 per cent of the observations are limit observations with no exports 
being reported to particular countries.  The appropriate analytical approach in this case is the 
Tobit model, using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.  Such a model can be specified 
as: 
(2) EXP* = ‟X + ,  and 
 EXP =  0  if EXP*  0 
  EXP* if EXP* > 0 , 
where EXP* is the latent variable (the potential exports from Morocco), EXP the observed value 
of the dependent variable (the actual exports flow to a particular country), X is the vector of 
independent countries,  the vector of slope coefficients, and  is an error term, which is i.i.d. 
The parameters of the model can be estimated using standard statistical packages, such as 
STATA.  But as usual in Tobit models, the interpretation of the slope coefficients creates 
problems, as they do not represent the marginal effects.  The latter can, however, be 
approximated as: 
(3) E[EXP]/X  = (Prob[0<EXP*] ˆ ). 
                                                 
10
 Geodesic distances in kilometers are available from CEPII which uses the great circle formula, based on 
the geographic coordinates of the capital cities.  For further details see 
http://www.cepii.com/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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Data on Morocco‟s exports to partner countries in 2003 are available in the UN Comtrade 
database.  In addition, bilateral information on services exports was obtained from Morocco‟s 
Bureau of Foreign Exchange.  Services exports other than tourism are not covered in the analysis 
due to lack of disaggregated data. 
 Based on the statistical model outlined above, several specifications were 
estimated.  Specification I corresponds to the formulation in with goods only are taken as the 
dependent variable, while specification II covers exports of both goods and tourism services.  The 
results from the regressions are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8: Tobit estimation of Moroccan exports 
 Specification I: 
Dependent variable: 
Moroccan good exports 
(2003) 
Specification II: 
Dependent variable: 
Moroccan goods and 
tourism exports (2003) 
 Coef. t statistics Coef. t statistics 
GDP 0.99*** 7.53 1.05*** 8.06 
POP 0.50*** 3.37 0.45*** 3.02 
DIST -1.79*** -16.7 -1.81*** -16.87 
ComLang 2.41*** 2.68 2.29*** 2.54 
PTA 0.36 0.42 0.66 0.77 
Log Likelihood -358.14  -357.78 
 
 
Number of observations: 174 with 142 uncensored observations. 
Note:  The superscript *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 per cent confidence level. 
Source:  World Bank staff. 
 
ANNEX 2:  SMART: A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
The partial equilibrium model SMART (Software for Market Access and Restrictions to 
Trade) is a simulation tool that is part of the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data 
retrieval and analysis framework.  The latter is being developed and mantained by the World 
Bank in cooperation with other international organizations.  It is available free of charge via the 
internet at http:\\wits.worldbank.org. 
SMART is used to support trade policy analysis by making it possible to quantify the 
economic and fiscal impacts of tariff changes.  The model is static and focuses on a single 
country at a time.  Hence, the tool does not capture intertemporal linkages between variables or 
interactions between contemporaneous reforms in several countries.  With these analytical 
limitations in mind, SMART can be used to estimate trade creation, trade diversion, economic 
welfare and tariff revenue effects of tariff policy reforms, such as those occuring as a result of 
preferential trade agreements.  A full technical description of the model can be found in UNECA 
(2005b). 
 
